linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching args

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Message-ID: <20241014145808.GA8567@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 16:58:09 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Ma Qiao <mqaio@...ux.alibaba.com>
Cc: linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org, rostedt@...dmis.org,
	mhiramat@...nel.org, mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com,
	namhyung.kim@....com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching
 args

Sorry, currently I don't have time to even try to read this patch, just
one note below...

On 10/14, Ma Qiao wrote:
>
> @@ -979,6 +980,11 @@ static struct uprobe_cpu_buffer *prepare_uprobe_buffer(struct trace_uprobe *tu,
>  	ucb = uprobe_buffer_get();
>  	ucb->dsize = tu->tp.size + dsize;
>  
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ucb->dsize > MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
> +		ucb->dsize = MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE;
> +		dsize = MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE - tu->tp.size;
> +	}
> +

Then you can probably kill the

	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ucb->dsize > PAGE_SIZE))

check in __uprobe_trace_func(), no?

Oleg.