lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <pnd7ca9r0pt.fsf@axis.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 20:52:37 +0200
From: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@...s.com>
To: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@...wei.com>
CC: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Sascha Hauer
	<s.hauer@...gutronix.de>, <kernel@...s.com>, <linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] ubifs: Fix use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit

On Sat, Oct 12, 2024 at 20:30 +0800 Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@...wei.com> wrote:

> 在 2024/10/9 22:46, Waqar Hameed 写道:
>> Running
>>    rm -f /etc/test-file.bin
>>    dd if=/dev/urandom of=/etc/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync
>> in a loop, with `CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION`, KASAN reports:
>>    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
>>    Write of size 32 at addr ffffff800a3af86c by task ubifs_bgt0_20/153
>>    Call trace:
>>     dump_backtrace+0x0/0x340
>>     show_stack+0x18/0x24
>>     dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xbc
>>     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b0
>>     kasan_report+0x1d8/0x1f0
>>     kasan_check_range+0xf8/0x1a0
>>     memcpy+0x84/0xf4
>>     ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
>>     do_commit+0x4e0/0x1340
>>     ubifs_bg_thread+0x234/0x2e0
>>     kthread+0x36c/0x410
>>     ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
>>    Allocated by task 401:
>>     kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
>>     __kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0xd0
>>     __kmalloc+0x34c/0x5bc
>>     tnc_insert+0x140/0x16a4
>>     ubifs_tnc_add+0x370/0x52c
>>     ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x5d8/0x870
>>     do_writepage+0x36c/0x510
>>     ubifs_writepage+0x190/0x4dc
>>     __writepage+0x58/0x154
>>     write_cache_pages+0x394/0x830
>>     do_writepages+0x1f0/0x5b0
>>     filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x170/0x25c
>>     file_write_and_wait_range+0x140/0x190
>>     ubifs_fsync+0xe8/0x290
>>     vfs_fsync_range+0xc0/0x1e4
>>     do_fsync+0x40/0x90
>>     __arm64_sys_fsync+0x34/0x50
>>     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
>>     do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
>>     el0_svc+0x34/0x70
>>     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
>>     el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
>>    Freed by task 403:
>>     kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
>>     kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40
>>     kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
>>     __kasan_slab_free+0xd4/0x13c
>>     kfree+0xc4/0x3a0
>>     tnc_delete+0x3f4/0xe40
>>     ubifs_tnc_remove_range+0x368/0x73c
>>     ubifs_tnc_remove_ino+0x29c/0x2e0
>>     ubifs_jnl_delete_inode+0x150/0x260
>>     ubifs_evict_inode+0x1d4/0x2e4
>>     evict+0x1c8/0x450
>>     iput+0x2a0/0x3c4
>>     do_unlinkat+0x2cc/0x490
>>     __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x90/0x100
>>     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
>>     do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
>>     el0_svc+0x34/0x70
>>     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
>>     el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
>> The offending `memcpy` is in `ubifs_copy_hash()`. Fix this by checking
>> if the `znode` is obsolete before accessing the hash (just like we do
>> for `znode->parent`).
>
> Do you mean that the UAF occurs in following path:
> do_commit -> ubifs_tnc_end_commit -> write_index:
> while (1) {
>    ...
>    znode = cnext;
>    ...
>    if (znode->cparent)
>      ubifs_copy_hash(c, hash, znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->ciip].hash);  //
>      znode->cparent has been freed!
> }

Yes, that's what KASAN reports. It's the `memcpy()` in
`ubifs_copy_hash()` that triggers the slab-use-after-free.

>
> If so, according to the current implementation(lastest linux kernel is v6.12), I
> cannot understand that how the znode->cparent is freed before write_index()
> finished, it looks impossible.
> All dirty znodes are gathered by function get_znodes_to_commit() which is
> protected by c->tnc_mutex, and the 'cparent' member in all dirty znodes is
> assigned with non-NULL. Then I think the znode memory freeing path
> 'tnc_delete->kfree(znode)' cannot happen, because:
> 1) If a znode is dirtied, all its' ancestor znodes(a path from znode to root
> znode) must be dirtied, which is guaranteed by UBIFS. See
> dirty_cow_bottom_up/lookup_level0_dirty.
> 2) A dirty znode waiting for commit cannot be freed before write_index()
> finished, which is guaranteed by tnc_delete:
>   if (znode->cnext) {
>     __set_bit(OBSOLETE_ZNODE, &znode->flags);
>     ...
>   } else {
>     kfree(znode);
>   }

I'm with you here. Initially I thought there was some lock missing
(since it is showing signs of a race, e.g. not deterministic). But as
you point out, it is protected with `tnc_mutex`, hence my "RFC" tag on
this patch.

>> Fixes: 16a26b20d2af ("ubifs: authentication: Add hashes to index nodes")
>> Signed-off-by: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@...s.com>
>> ---
>> I'm not entirely sure if this is the _correct_ way to fix this. However,
>> testing shows that the problem indeed disappears.
>> My understanding is that the `znode` could concurrently be deleted (with
>> a reference in an unprotected code section without `tnc_mutex`). The
>> assumption is that in this case it would be sufficient to check
>> `ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode)`, like as in the if-statement for
>> `znode->parent` just below.
>
> I'm analyzing tnc-related code these days, however I can't find places that may
> concurrently operate the same znode. And I cannot reproduce the problem with
> your reproducer:
> while true; do
>   rm -f /UBIFS_MNT/test-file.bin
>   dd if=/dev/urandom of=/UBIFS_MNT/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync
> done

For completeness, here are the _exact_ steps that I have used to
reproduce this on my system with v6.12-rc2 (commit 75b607fab38d "Merge
tag 'sched_ext-for-6.12-rc2-fixes' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/sched_ext"):

```
ubiattach -m 2

keyctl add logon dummy_key: dummy_load @us

ubimkvol /dev/ubi0 -s 80MiB -n 0 -N test-vol
ubiupdatevol /dev/ubi0_0 -t

mount -t ubifs /dev/ubi0_0 /mnt/flash -o auth_hash_name=sha256,auth_key=dummy_key:

count=0
while true; do
    date
    count=$(($count + 1))
    echo count=$count

    rm -f /mnt/flash/test-file.bin
    dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/flash/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync

    echo ""
done
```

Note that you need to have `CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION=y` (and
`CONFIG_KASAN=y` obviously) in your `.config` in order to trigger the
offending `memcpy()` in `ubifs_copy_hash()`. Also, it takes a while. For
example, last time it took me 88 iterations of the above loop before it
triggered. So you might need to let it spin for a while.

>
> Can you dig more deeper by adding more debug message, so that we can figure out
> what is really happening.

Certainly! I could try to enable the debug prints from UBIFS, however
they are *a lot*. Moreover, printing that much changes the timing
behavior and might make it harder to trigger the use-after-free. Do you
have any tips on where we should try to focus the debug prints (a
dynamic debug filter).

[...]


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ