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Message-ID: <46017A8E-88EB-4B8D-9FB2-643F9A5BF7F0@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 21:42:19 +0000
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
CC: "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type
(VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE)
> On Oct 17, 2024, at 1:20 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2024-10-17 at 09:55 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Add a new verification type called VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE. This
>> new
>> usage will be used for validating keys added to the new clavis LSM
>> keyring.
>> This will be introduced in a follow-on patch.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
>> ---
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 1 +
>> include/linux/verification.h | 2 ++
>> 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> index 43af5fa510c0..d7bf95c77f4a 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const
>> key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
>> [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
>> [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
>> [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
>> + [VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE] = "clavis sig",
>> };
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> index f0d4ff3c20a8..1dc80e68ce96 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> @@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> }
>> /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
>> break;
>> + case VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE:
>> case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
>> if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
>> pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-
>> data)\n");
>> diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h
>> b/include/linux/verification.h
>> index cb2d47f28091..02d2d70e2324 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/verification.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
>> @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
>> VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
>> VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
>> VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
>> + /* Add new entries above, keep VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE at
>> the end. */
>> + VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE,
>> NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
>> };
>> extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
>
> This looks as good as it can get. Just wondering that does this Clavis
> thing connect with the TPM2 asymmetric keys that I've been working on?
> I.e. can they be used in tandem. I should really update that patch set
> (latest from April).
With some changes, I think they could be used in tandem. If I'm looking at
the correct series, tpm2_key_rsa_describe would need to be changed to
return a unique identifier, instead of "TPM2/RSA". This identifier could be
used instead of the skid when creating a Clavis ACL. There would probably
also need to be a new system kernel keyring containing these TPM keys.
Similar to the builtin, secondary, machine, etc.
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