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Message-ID: <cover.1729201904.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 14:55:19 -0700
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec()
At least for now, continue to assume mask_user_address() is safe on AMD
when combined with STAC/CLAC -- as get_user(), put_user() and
masked_user_access_begin() already do today.
v2:
- Separate copy_to_user() and clear_user() changes out into separate patches
- Add masking to __get_user() and __put_user()
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/b626840e55d4aa86b4b9b377a4cc2cda7038d33d.1728706156.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Josh Poimboeuf (6):
x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in copy_from_user()
x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in __get_user()
x86/uaccess: Rearrange putuser.S
x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to __put_user()
x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to copy_to_user()
x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to clear_user()
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 10 ++--
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 27 +++++++--
arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 92 ++++++++++++++++++------------
include/linux/uaccess.h | 6 --
5 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
--
2.47.0
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