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Message-ID: <b92c58da-ec94-409b-8cdf-46eb3d2c7870@suse.cz>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 23:35:24 +0200
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, "Paul E . McKenney"
<paulmck@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Muchun Song <muchun.song@...ux.dev>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>, Matt Turner
<mattst88@...il.com>, Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
"James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Chris Zankel <chris@...kel.net>,
Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, Sidhartha Kumar
<sidhartha.kumar@...cle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page
mechanism
On 10/21/24 23:20, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> I don't think there's really any value in that. There's just no sensible
>> situation in which a user would care about this I don't think.
>
> Making sure nobody touches an area, and wile doing that somebody already
> touched that area? I guess it could be worked around by
> mprotect(PROT_NONE),madvise(GUARD),mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE) ...
> which is not particularly nice :)
>
>>
>> And if you're saying 'hey do MADV_DONTNEED if this fails and keep trying!'
>> then why not just do that in the kernel?
>
> Heh, no!
>
> If user space doesn't expect there to be something, it should *fail*.
> That's likely going to be the majority of use cases for guard pages
> (happy to be told otherwise). No retry.
>
> And if user space expects there to be something it should zap ahead of
> time (which some allocators maybe already do to free up memory after
> free()) to then install the guard. No retry.
>
> There is this case where user space might be unsure. There, it might
> make sense to retry exactly once.
I've thought so too and the RFC was implemented like this, but Jann came up
with a scenario where a THP can cause the range including our
to-be-installed guard pte to be populated even if the userspace is not
trying to access that exact address, see here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG48ez3vqbqyWb4bLdpqSUnhwqGo2OQetecNhEGPdCGDr94nbQ@mail.gmail.com/
So unless we can't *reliably* detect that userspace is really shooting
itself in the foot and return a failure to install guard pte *only* in that
case (which would be useful), and not horribly complicate everything to
ensure that reliability and to avoid false positives due to races with
THP's, then it's probably better to just retry as this version does.
>>
>> Trying to explain to a user 'hey this is for installing guard pages but if
>> there's a facing fault it'll fail and that could keep happening and then
>> you'll have to zap and maybe in a loop' just... seems like a bloody awful
>> interface?
>
> Hope my example above made it clearer. This "retry forever until it
> works" use case doesn't quite make sense to me, but I might just be
> missing something important.
>
> But again, I have to do more reading on the history of the current
> approach ... and it's fairly late here.
Yeah see the RFC thread linked above.
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