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Message-ID: <20241021-ausgleichen-wesen-3d3ae116f742@brauner>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 15:24:30 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...a.com>,
Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Team <kernel-team@...a.com>, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Extend test fs_kfuncs to
cover security.bpf xattr names
On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 08:03:51AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 16, 2024 at 04:51:37PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > >
> > > I think that getting user.* xattrs from bpf hooks can still be useful for
> > > introspection and other tasks so I'm not convinced we should revert that
> > > functionality but maybe it is too easy to misuse? I'm not really decided.
> >
> > Reading user.* xattr is fine. If an LSM decides to built a security
> > model around it then imho that's their business and since that happens
> > in out-of-tree LSM programs: shrug.
>
> By that argument user.kfuncs is even more useless as just being able
> to read all xattrs should be just as fine.
bpf shouldn't read security.* of another LSM or a host of other examples...
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