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Message-ID: <5afafb29-85d8-4d51-8a7f-be2186224e7d@lucifer.local>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 21:45:30 +0100
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
        "Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Muchun Song <muchun.song@...ux.dev>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
        Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>,
        Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>,
        Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
        "James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Chris Zankel <chris@...kel.net>,
        Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@...cle.com>,
        Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page
 mechanism

On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 09:57:39PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 9:35 PM Lorenzo Stoakes
> <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 09:08:53PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 10:46 PM Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz> wrote:
> > > > On 10/21/24 22:27, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > > > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 10:11:29PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > > > >> On 10/20/24 18:20, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > > > >> > +  while (true) {
> > > > >> > +          /* Returns < 0 on error, == 0 if success, > 0 if zap needed. */
> > > > >> > +          err = walk_page_range_mm(vma->vm_mm, start, end,
> > > > >> > +                                   &guard_poison_walk_ops, NULL);
> > > > >> > +          if (err <= 0)
> > > > >> > +                  return err;
> > > > >> > +
> > > > >> > +          /*
> > > > >> > +           * OK some of the range have non-guard pages mapped, zap
> > > > >> > +           * them. This leaves existing guard pages in place.
> > > > >> > +           */
> > > > >> > +          zap_page_range_single(vma, start, end - start, NULL);
> > > > >>
> > > > >> ... however the potentially endless loop doesn't seem great. Could a
> > > > >> malicious program keep refaulting the range (ignoring any segfaults if it
> > > > >> loses a race) with one thread while failing to make progress here with
> > > > >> another thread? Is that ok because it would only punish itself?
> > > > >
> > > > > Sigh. Again, I don't think you've read the previous series have you? Or
> > > > > even the changelog... I added this as Jann asked for it. Originally we'd
> > > > > -EAGAIN if we got raced. See the discussion over in v1 for details.
> > > > >
> > > > > I did it that way specifically to avoid such things, but Jann didn't appear
> > > > > to think it was a problem.
> > > >
> > > > If Jann is fine with this then it must be secure enough.
> > >
> > > My thinking there was:
> > >
> > > We can legitimately race with adjacent faults populating the area
> > > we're operating on with THP pages; as long as the zapping and
> > > poison-marker-setting are separate, *someone* will have to do the
> > > retry. Either we do it in the kernel, or we tell userspace to handle
> > > it, but having the kernel take care of it is preferable because it
> > > makes the stable UAPI less messy.
> > >
> > > One easy way to do it in the kernel would be to return -ERESTARTNOINTR
> > > after the zap_page_range_single() instead of jumping back up, which in
> > > terms of locking and signal handling and such would be equivalent to
> > > looping in userspace (because really that's what -ERESTARTNOINTR does
> > > - it returns out to userspace and moves the instruction pointer back
> > > to restart the syscall). Though if we do that immediately, it might
> > > make MADV_POISON unnecessarily slow, so we should probably retry once
> > > before doing that. The other easy way is to just loop here.
> >
> > Yes we should definitely retry probably a few times to cover the rare
> > situation of a THP race as you describe under non-abusive circumstances.
> >
> > >
> > > The cond_resched() and pending fatal signal check mean that (except on
> > > CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE) the only differences between the current
> > > implementation and looping in userspace are that we don't handle
> > > non-fatal signals in between iterations and that we keep hogging the
> > > mmap_lock in read mode. We do already have a bunch of codepaths that
> > > retry on concurrent page table changes, like when zap_pte_range()
> > > encounters a pte_offset_map_lock() failure; though I guess the
> > > difference is that the retry on those is just a couple instructions,
> > > which would be harder to race consistently, while here we redo walks
> > > across the entire range, which should be fairly easy to race
> > > repeatedly.
> > >
> > > So I guess you have a point that this might be the easiest way to
> > > stall other tasks that are trying to take mmap_lock for an extended
> > > amount of time, I did not fully consider that... and then I guess you
> > > could use that to slow down usercopy fault handling (once the lock
> > > switches to handoff mode because of a stalled writer?) or slow down
> > > other processes trying to read /proc/$pid/cmdline?
> >
> > Hm does that need a write lock?
>
> No, but if you have one reader that is hogging the rwsem, and then a
> writer is queued up on the rwsem afterwards, I think new readers will
> sometimes be queued up behind the writer. So even though the rwsem is
> only actually held by a reader, new readers can't immediately take the
> rwsem because the rwsem code thinks that would be unfair to a pending
> writer who just wants to make some quick change. I'm not super
> familiar with this code, but basically I think it works roughly like
> this:
>
> If the rwsem code notices that a bunch of readers are preventing a
> writer from taking the lock, the rwsem code will start queuing new
> readers behind the queued writer. You can see in rwsem_read_trylock()
> that the trylock fastpath is skipped if anyone is waiting on the rwsem
> or the handoff flag is set, and in rwsem_down_read_slowpath() the
> "reader optimistic lock stealing" path is skipped if the lock is
> currently held by multiple readers or if the handoff bit is set.
>
> The handoff bit can be set in rwsem_try_write_lock() by a writer "if
> it is an RT task or wait in the wait queue for too long". Basically I
> think it means something like "I think other users of the lock are
> hogging it more than they should, stop stealing the lock from me".
> And the RWSEM_WAIT_TIMEOUT for triggering handoff mode is pretty
> short, RWSEM_WAIT_TIMEOUT is defined to something like 4ms, so I think
> that's how long writers tolerate the lock being hogged by readers
> before they prevent new readers from stealing the lock.

Ack makes sense! -ERESTARTNOINTR should help resolve this so definitely
unless anybody has any objection to that I'll go ahead and do a respin
taking that approach (+ all otehr fixes) for v2.

Thanks for your input!

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