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Message-ID: <b5792b5f-298b-499f-abc2-db773ceeed36@lucifer.local>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 10:18:32 +0100
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
fw@...eb.enyo.de, James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com,
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Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] implement lightweight guard pages
On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 11:13:47AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 23.10.24 11:06, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > On 10/23/24 10:56, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Overall while I sympathise with this, it feels dangerous and a pretty major
> > > > change, because there'll be something somewhere that will break because it
> > > > expects faults to be swallowed that we no longer do swallow.
> > > >
> > > > So I'd say it'd be something we should defer, but of course it's a highly
> > > > user-facing change so how easy that would be I don't know.
> > > >
> > > > But I definitely don't think a 'introduce the ability to do cheap PROT_NONE
> > > > guards' series is the place to also fundmentally change how user access
> > > > page faults are handled within the kernel :)
> > >
> > > Will delivering signals on kernel access be a backwards compatible
> > > change? Or will we need a different API? MADV_GUARD_POISON_KERNEL?
> > > It's just somewhat painful to detect/update all userspace if we add
> > > this feature in future. Can we say signal delivery on kernel accesses
> > > is unspecified?
> >
> > Would adding signal delivery to guard PTEs only help enough the ASAN etc
> > usecase? Wouldn't it be instead possible to add some prctl to opt-in the
> > whole ASANized process to deliver all existing segfaults as signals instead
> > of -EFAULT ?
>
> Not sure if it is an "instead", you might have to deliver the signal in
> addition to letting the syscall fail (not that I would be an expert on
> signal delivery :D ).
>
> prctl sounds better, or some way to configure the behavior on VMA ranges;
> otherwise we would need yet another marker, which is not the end of the
> world but would make it slightly more confusing.
>
Yeah prctl() sounds sensible, and since we are explicitly adding a marker
for guard pages here we can do this as a follow up too without breaking any
userland expectations, i.e. 'new feature to make guard pages signal' is not
going to contradict the default behaviour.
So all makes sense to me, but I do think best as a follow up! :)
> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>
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