linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] implement lightweight guard pages

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Message-ID: <CANpmjNM_q-+FH4S8UxRqnomfT7oneN5kcFf_Sxn6cStCCqoKeQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 13:31:21 +0200
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, 
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, fw@...eb.enyo.de, 
	James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, Liam.Howlett@...cle.com, 
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, arnd@...db.de, brauner@...nel.org, 
	chris@...kel.net, deller@....de, hch@...radead.org, ink@...assic.park.msu.ru, 
	jannh@...gle.com, jcmvbkbc@...il.com, jeffxu@...omium.org, 
	jhubbard@...dia.com, linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, mattst88@...il.com, 
	muchun.song@...ux.dev, paulmck@...nel.org, richard.henderson@...aro.org, 
	shuah@...nel.org, sidhartha.kumar@...cle.com, surenb@...gle.com, 
	tsbogend@...ha.franken.de, willy@...radead.org, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] implement lightweight guard pages

On Wed, 23 Oct 2024 at 11:29, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On 23.10.24 11:18, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 11:13:47AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >> On 23.10.24 11:06, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> >>> On 10/23/24 10:56, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Overall while I sympathise with this, it feels dangerous and a pretty major
> >>>>> change, because there'll be something somewhere that will break because it
> >>>>> expects faults to be swallowed that we no longer do swallow.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> So I'd say it'd be something we should defer, but of course it's a highly
> >>>>> user-facing change so how easy that would be I don't know.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But I definitely don't think a 'introduce the ability to do cheap PROT_NONE
> >>>>> guards' series is the place to also fundmentally change how user access
> >>>>> page faults are handled within the kernel :)
> >>>>
> >>>> Will delivering signals on kernel access be a backwards compatible
> >>>> change? Or will we need a different API? MADV_GUARD_POISON_KERNEL?
> >>>> It's just somewhat painful to detect/update all userspace if we add
> >>>> this feature in future. Can we say signal delivery on kernel accesses
> >>>> is unspecified?
> >>>
> >>> Would adding signal delivery to guard PTEs only help enough the ASAN etc
> >>> usecase? Wouldn't it be instead possible to add some prctl to opt-in the
> >>> whole ASANized process to deliver all existing segfaults as signals instead
> >>> of -EFAULT ?
> >>
> >> Not sure if it is an "instead", you might have to deliver the signal in
> >> addition to letting the syscall fail (not that I would be an expert on
> >> signal delivery :D ).
> >>
> >> prctl sounds better, or some way to configure the behavior on VMA ranges;
> >> otherwise we would need yet another marker, which is not the end of the
> >> world but would make it slightly more confusing.
> >>
> >
> > Yeah prctl() sounds sensible, and since we are explicitly adding a marker
> > for guard pages here we can do this as a follow up too without breaking any
> > userland expectations, i.e. 'new feature to make guard pages signal' is not
> > going to contradict the default behaviour.
> >
> > So all makes sense to me, but I do think best as a follow up! :)
>
> Yeah, fully agreed. And my gut feeling is that it might not be that easy
> ... :)
>
> In the end, what we want is *some* notification that a guard PTE was
> accessed. Likely the notification must not necessarily completely
> synchronous (although it would be ideal) and it must not be a signal.
>
> Maybe having a different way to obtain that information from user space
> would work.

For bug detection tools (like GWP-ASan [1]) it's essential to have
useful stack traces. As such, having this signal be synchronous would
be more useful. I don't see how one could get a useful stack trace (or
other information like what's stashed away in ucontext like CPU
registers) if this were asynchronous.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.09394