linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] dm-inlinecrypt: Add inline encryption support

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAAdYy_=OT27UvZ4cNWPLLiEaMo5wkwS+BUv=+=x7-6oE4TsnWQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 23:17:19 -0400
From: Adrian Vovk <adrianvovk@...il.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Md Sadre Alam <quic_mdalam@...cinc.com>, axboe@...nel.dk, 
	song@...nel.org, yukuai3@...wei.com, agk@...hat.com, snitzer@...nel.org, 
	Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@...hat.com>, adrian.hunter@...el.com, quic_asutoshd@...cinc.com, 
	ritesh.list@...il.com, ulf.hansson@...aro.org, andersson@...nel.org, 
	konradybcio@...nel.org, kees@...nel.org, gustavoars@...nel.org, 
	linux-block@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-raid@...r.kernel.org, dm-devel@...ts.linux.dev, 
	linux-mmc@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, quic_srichara@...cinc.com, 
	quic_varada@...cinc.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] dm-inlinecrypt: Add inline encryption support

> Alternatively, if I recall correctly it should be possible to just
> check if the bio has an attached encryption context. If it has one,
> then just pass-through. If it doesn't, then attach your own. No flag
> required this way, and dm-default-key would only add encryption iff
> the data isn't already encrypted.

This piqued my interest, so I went and did some git archeology to see
why this isn't the case and there's a flag now. Apparently fscrypt
will sometimes rearrange blocks without the key present. This is fine,
because if there's no key, blk-crypto doesn't need to do anything and
we can just shuffle the encrypted data around. We definitely don't
want to re-encrypt the data in that scenario.

Also, thinking about it a bit more: what should happen if we stack
dm-crypt on top of dm-default-key. I see no point in double-encrypting
even in this situation. So, dm-crypt would set the flag to skip
dm-default-key, even though it's not actually attaching an encryption
context to the bio.

So it seems like the flag is the better solution. It would just be
impermissible to set the flag on a request that will write plaintext
data to disk.

- Adrian