linux-kernel - [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/virt/tdx: Require the module to assert it has the NO_RBP

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ee60708b0da775e50c49a8c569f27a96770edf64.1730118186.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 01:41:11 +1300
From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
To: dave.hansen@...el.com,
	kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com,
	tglx@...utronix.de,
	bp@...en8.de,
	peterz@...radead.org,
	mingo@...hat.com,
	hpa@...or.com,
	dan.j.williams@...el.com,
	seanjc@...gle.com,
	pbonzini@...hat.com
Cc: x86@...nel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org,
	rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
	isaku.yamahata@...el.com,
	adrian.hunter@...el.com,
	nik.borisov@...e.com,
	kai.huang@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/virt/tdx: Require the module to assert it has the NO_RBP_MOD mitigation

Old TDX modules can clobber RBP in the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL.  However
RBP is used as frame pointer in the x86_64 calling convention, and
clobbering RBP could result in bad things like being unable to unwind
the stack if any non-maskable exceptions (NMI, #MC etc) happens in that
gap.

A new "NO_RBP_MOD" feature was introduced to more recent TDX modules to
not clobber RBP.  This feature is reported in the TDX_FEATURES0 global
metadata field via bit 18.

Don't initialize the TDX module if this feature is not supported [1].

Note the bit definitions of TDX_FEATURES0 are not auto-generated in
tdx_global_metadata.h.  Manually define a macro for it in "tdx.h".

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/fc0e8ab7-86d4-4428-be31-82e1ece6dd21@intel.com/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
index 9acb12c75e9b..9bc827a6cee8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -326,6 +326,18 @@ static int init_tdx_sys_info(struct tdx_sys_info *sysinfo)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int check_features(struct tdx_sys_info *sysinfo)
+{
+	u64 tdx_features0 = sysinfo->features.tdx_features0;
+
+	if (!(tdx_features0 & TDX_FEATURES0_NO_RBP_MOD)) {
+		pr_err("frame pointer (RBP) clobber bug present, upgrade TDX module\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Calculate the actual TDMR size */
 static int tdmr_size_single(u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr)
 {
@@ -1109,6 +1121,11 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	/* Check whether the kernel can support this module */
+	ret = check_features(&sysinfo);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	/*
 	 * To keep things simple, assume that all TDX-protected memory
 	 * will come from the page allocator.  Make sure all pages in the
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
index 0128b963b723..c8be00f6b15a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/compiler_attributes.h>
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/bits.h>
 #include "tdx_global_metadata.h"
 
 /*
@@ -54,6 +55,9 @@ struct tdmr_info {
 	DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct tdmr_reserved_area, reserved_areas);
 } __packed __aligned(TDMR_INFO_ALIGNMENT);
 
+/* Bit definitions of TDX_FEATURES0 metadata field */
+#define TDX_FEATURES0_NO_RBP_MOD	BIT(18)
+
 /*
  * Do not put any hardware-defined TDX structure representations below
  * this comment!
-- 
2.46.2