[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20241028160917.1380714-17-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 18:08:04 +0200
From: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@...driver.com>,
Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@....com>,
Breno Leitao <leitao@...ian.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Hou Tao <houtao1@...wei.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@...il.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Changbin Du <changbin.du@...wei.com>,
Huang Shijie <shijie@...amperecomputing.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@...der.be>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 16/16] Revert "x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases"
This reverts commit 3267cb6d3a174ff83d6287dcd5b0047bbd912452.
LASS mitigates the Spectre based on LAM (SLAM) [1] and an earlier
commit made LAM depend on LASS, so we no longer need to disable LAM at
compile time, so revert the commit that disables LAM.
[1] https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0bdb7a394f59..192d5145f54e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2257,7 +2257,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
config ADDRESS_MASKING
bool "Linear Address Masking support"
depends on X86_64
- depends on COMPILE_TEST || !CPU_MITIGATIONS # wait for LASS
help
Linear Address Masking (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied
to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the
--
2.45.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists