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Message-ID: <20241029055223.210039-4-coxu@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 13:52:16 +0800
From: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
To: kexec@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@...hat.com>,
	Milan Broz <gmazyland@...il.com>,
	Thomas Staudt <tstaudt@...ibm.com>,
	Daniel P . Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com>,
	Kairui Song <ryncsn@...il.com>,
	Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@...hat.com>,
	Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@...il.com>,
	Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
	Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	x86@...nel.org,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org (open list:KERNEL HARDENING (not covered by other areas):Keyword:\b__counted_by\b)
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/7] crash_dump: store dm crypt keys in kdump reserved memory

When the kdump kernel image and initrd are loaded, the dm crypts keys
will be read from keyring and then stored in kdump reserved memory.

Assume a key won't exceed 256 bytes thus MAX_KEY_SIZE=256 according to
"cryptsetup benchmark".

Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
---
 include/linux/crash_core.h   |   6 +-
 include/linux/kexec.h        |   4 ++
 kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/crash_core.h b/include/linux/crash_core.h
index 44305336314e..2e6782239034 100644
--- a/include/linux/crash_core.h
+++ b/include/linux/crash_core.h
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ static inline void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void) { }
 static inline void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void) { }
 #endif
 
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DM_CRYPT
+int crash_load_dm_crypt_keys(struct kimage *image);
+#else
+static inline int crash_load_dm_crypt_keys(struct kimage *image) {return 0; }
+#endif
 
 #ifndef arch_crash_handle_hotplug_event
 static inline void arch_crash_handle_hotplug_event(struct kimage *image, void *arg) { }
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index 0dc66ca2506a..5bda0978bab3 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -396,6 +396,10 @@ struct kimage {
 	void *elf_headers;
 	unsigned long elf_headers_sz;
 	unsigned long elf_load_addr;
+
+	/* dm crypt keys buffer */
+	unsigned long dm_crypt_keys_addr;
+	unsigned long dm_crypt_keys_sz;
 };
 
 /* kexec interface functions */
diff --git a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c
index 62a3c47d8b3b..ec2ec2967242 100644
--- a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c
+++ b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c
@@ -1,14 +1,62 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/configfs.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 #define KEY_NUM_MAX 128	/* maximum dm crypt keys */
+#define KEY_SIZE_MAX 256	/* maximum dm crypt key size */
 #define KEY_DESC_MAX_LEN 128	/* maximum dm crypt key description size */
 
 static unsigned int key_count;
 
+struct dm_crypt_key {
+	unsigned int key_size;
+	char key_desc[KEY_DESC_MAX_LEN];
+	u8 data[KEY_SIZE_MAX];
+};
+
+static struct keys_header {
+	unsigned int total_keys;
+	struct dm_crypt_key keys[] __counted_by(total_keys);
+} *keys_header;
+
+static size_t get_keys_header_size(size_t total_keys)
+{
+	return struct_size(keys_header, keys, total_keys);
+}
+
+static int read_key_from_user_keying(struct dm_crypt_key *dm_key)
+{
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+	struct key *key;
+
+	kexec_dprintk("Requesting key %s", dm_key->key_desc);
+	key = request_key(&key_type_logon, dm_key->key_desc, NULL);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_warn("No such key %s\n", dm_key->key_desc);
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+	}
+
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	if (!ukp)
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	if (ukp->datalen > KEY_SIZE_MAX) {
+		pr_err("Key size %u exceeds maximum (%u)\n", ukp->datalen, KEY_SIZE_MAX);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(dm_key->data, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+	dm_key->key_size = ukp->datalen;
+	kexec_dprintk("Get dm crypt key (size=%u) %s: %8ph\n", dm_key->key_size,
+		      dm_key->key_desc, dm_key->data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 struct config_key {
 	struct config_item item;
 	const char *description;
@@ -130,6 +178,87 @@ static struct configfs_subsystem config_keys_subsys = {
 	},
 };
 
+static int build_keys_header(void)
+{
+	struct config_item *item = NULL;
+	struct config_key *key;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if (keys_header != NULL)
+		kvfree(keys_header);
+
+	keys_header = kzalloc(get_keys_header_size(key_count), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!keys_header)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	keys_header->total_keys = key_count;
+
+	i = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry(item, &config_keys_subsys.su_group.cg_children,
+			    ci_entry) {
+		if (item->ci_type != &config_key_type)
+			continue;
+
+		key = to_config_key(item);
+
+		strscpy(keys_header->keys[i].key_desc, key->description,
+			KEY_DESC_MAX_LEN);
+		r = read_key_from_user_keying(&keys_header->keys[i]);
+		if (r != 0) {
+			kexec_dprintk("Failed to read key %s\n",
+				      keys_header->keys[i].key_desc);
+			return r;
+		}
+		i++;
+		kexec_dprintk("Found key: %s\n", item->ci_name);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crash_load_dm_crypt_keys(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	struct kexec_buf kbuf = {
+		.image = image,
+		.buf_min = 0,
+		.buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
+		.top_down = false,
+		.random = true,
+	};
+	int r;
+
+
+	if (key_count <= 0) {
+		kexec_dprintk("No dm-crypt keys\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	image->dm_crypt_keys_addr = 0;
+	r = build_keys_header();
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	kbuf.buffer = keys_header;
+	kbuf.bufsz = get_keys_header_size(key_count);
+
+	kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
+	kbuf.buf_align = ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN;
+	kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
+	r = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
+	if (r) {
+		kvfree((void *)kbuf.buffer);
+		return r;
+	}
+	image->dm_crypt_keys_addr = kbuf.mem;
+	image->dm_crypt_keys_sz = kbuf.bufsz;
+	kexec_dprintk(
+		"Loaded dm crypt keys to kexec_buffer bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
+		kbuf.bufsz, kbuf.bufsz);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+
 static int __init configfs_dmcrypt_keys_init(void)
 {
 	int ret;
-- 
2.47.0


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