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Message-ID: <3ea9cbf7-aea2-4d30-971e-d2ca5c00fb66@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 16:41:50 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@....com, bp@...en8.de, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
pgonda@...gle.com, seanjc@...gle.com, pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
On 10/28/2024 1:34 PM, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> Add support for Secure TSC in SNP-enabled guests. Secure TSC allows guests
> to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions, ensuring that the parameters
> used cannot be altered by the hypervisor once the guest is launched.
>
> Secure TSC-enabled guests need to query TSC information from the AMD
> Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD
> Security Processor and the guest, with the hypervisor acting merely as a
> conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each
> message is protected with AEAD (AES-256 GCM). Use a minimal AES GCM library
> to encrypt and decrypt SNP guest messages for communication with the PSP.
>
> Use mem_encrypt_init() to fetch SNP TSC information from the AMD Security
> Processor and initialize snp_tsc_scale and snp_tsc_offset.
Why do it inside mem_encrypt_init()?
It's better to introduce a snp_guest_init/setup() like tdx_early_init()
to do all the SNP related setup stuff instead of scattering them all
around the kernel code.
> During secondary
> CPU initialization, set the VMSA fields GUEST_TSC_SCALE (offset 2F0h) and
> GUEST_TSC_OFFSET (offset 2F8h) with snp_tsc_scale and snp_tsc_offset,
> respectively.
>
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