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Message-ID: <d871e7e8d0c874bb59fd3d43eb0afdffb87d9eed.camel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2024 17:11:52 -0400
From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini
 <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] KVM: x86: Bypass register cache when querying
 CPL from kvm_sched_out()

On Wed, 2024-10-09 at 10:49 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> When querying guest CPL to determine if a vCPU was preempted while in
> kernel mode, bypass the register cache, i.e. always read SS.AR_BYTES from
> the VMCS on Intel CPUs.  If the kernel is running with full preemption
> enabled, using the register cache in the preemption path can result in
> stale and/or uninitialized data being cached in the segment cache.
> 
> In particular the following scenario is currently possible:
> 
>  - vCPU is just created, and the vCPU thread is preempted before
>    SS.AR_BYTES is written in vmx_vcpu_reset().
> 
>  - When scheduling out the vCPU task, kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() =>
>    vmx_get_cpl() reads and caches '0' for SS.AR_BYTES.
> 
>  - vmx_vcpu_reset() => seg_setup() configures SS.AR_BYTES, but doesn't
>    invoke vmx_segment_cache_clear() to invalidate the cache.
> 
> As a result, KVM retains a stale value in the cache, which can be read,
> e.g. via KVM_GET_SREGS.  Usually this is not a problem because the VMX
> segment cache is reset on each VM-Exit, but if the userspace VMM (e.g KVM
> selftests) reads and writes system registers just after the vCPU was
> created, _without_ modifying SS.AR_BYTES, userspace will write back the
> stale '0' value and ultimately will trigger a VM-Entry failure due to
> incorrect SS segment type.
> 
> Note, the VM-Enter failure can also be avoided by moving the call to
> vmx_segment_cache_clear() until after the vmx_vcpu_reset() initializes all
> segments.  However, while that change is correct and desirable (and will
> come along shortly), it does not address the underlying problem that
> accessing KVM's register caches from !task context is generally unsafe.
> 
> In addition to fixing the immediate bug, bypassing the cache for this
> particular case will allow hardening KVM register caching log to assert
> that the caches are accessed only when KVM _knows_ it is safe to do so.
> 
> Fixes: de63ad4cf497 ("KVM: X86: implement the logic for spinlock optimization")
> Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240716022014.240960-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h             |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |  8 +++++++-
>  7 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index 861d080ed4c6..5aff7222e40f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_msr)
>  KVM_X86_OP(get_segment_base)
>  KVM_X86_OP(get_segment)
>  KVM_X86_OP(get_cpl)
> +KVM_X86_OP(get_cpl_no_cache)
>  KVM_X86_OP(set_segment)
>  KVM_X86_OP(get_cs_db_l_bits)
>  KVM_X86_OP(is_valid_cr0)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 6d9f763a7bb9..3ae90df0a177 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1656,6 +1656,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>  	void (*get_segment)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  			    struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
>  	int (*get_cpl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +	int (*get_cpl_no_cache)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  	void (*set_segment)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  			    struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
>  	void (*get_cs_db_l_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 9df3e1e5ae81..50f6b0e03d04 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -5031,6 +5031,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>  	.get_segment = svm_get_segment,
>  	.set_segment = svm_set_segment,
>  	.get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
> +	.get_cpl_no_cache = svm_get_cpl,
>  	.get_cs_db_l_bits = svm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
>  	.is_valid_cr0 = svm_is_valid_cr0,
>  	.set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index 7668e2fb8043..92d35cc6cd15 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
>  	.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
>  	.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
>  	.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
> +	.get_cpl_no_cache = vmx_get_cpl_no_cache,
>  	.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
>  	.is_valid_cr0 = vmx_is_valid_cr0,
>  	.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 1a4438358c5e..12dd7009efbe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -3568,16 +3568,29 @@ u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
>  	return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
>  }
>  
> -int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +static int __vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool no_cache)
>  {
>  	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> +	int ar;
>  
>  	if (unlikely(vmx->rmode.vm86_active))
>  		return 0;
> -	else {
> -		int ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
> -		return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
> -	}
> +
> +	if (no_cache)
> +		ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES);
> +	else
> +		ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
> +	return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
> +}
> +
> +int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	return __vmx_get_cpl(vcpu, false);
> +}
> +
> +int vmx_get_cpl_no_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	return __vmx_get_cpl(vcpu, true);
>  }
>  
>  static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index 2325f773a20b..bcf40c7f3a38 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
>  			unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base);
>  int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +int vmx_get_cpl_no_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 83fe0a78146f..830073294640 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -5094,7 +5094,13 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	int idx;
>  
>  	if (vcpu->preempted) {
> -		vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel = kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel(vcpu);
> +		/*
> +		 * Assume protected guests are in-kernel.  Inefficient yielding
> +		 * due to false positives is preferable to never yielding due
> +		 * to false negatives.
> +		 */
> +		vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel = vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected ||
> +						 !kvm_x86_call(get_cpl_no_cache)(vcpu);
>  
>  		/*
>  		 * Take the srcu lock as memslots will be accessed to check the gfn


Initially I thought that we need to do this for the CPL, and the RIP at least, but
if this is done only for the CPL, it is reasonable IMHO.

Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky





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