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Message-Id: <D5ACNMVX5LXB.1L0S9P2J3UDJH@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:37:27 +0200
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "Ross Philipson"
 <ross.philipson@...cle.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
 <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
 <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
 <kexec@...ts.infradead.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
 <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com>, <mingo@...hat.com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
 <hpa@...or.com>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <ardb@...nel.org>,
 <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
 <peterhuewe@....de>, <jgg@...pe.ca>, <luto@...capital.net>,
 <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>, <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
 <davem@...emloft.net>, <corbet@....net>, <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
 <dwmw2@...radead.org>, <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
 <kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com>, <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
 <trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux
 kernel support

On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 13 2024 at 13:04, Ross Philipson wrote:
> > The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to
> > enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of
> > focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing
> > a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of
> > Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing
> > a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and
> > cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming
> > Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel
> > follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution
> > Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a
> > boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has
> > been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional
> > component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the
> > Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in
> > development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage
> > and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available.
> >
> > This patchset provides detailed documentation of DRTM, the approach used for
> > adding the capbility, and relevant API/ABI documentation. In addition to the
> > documentation the patch set introduces Intel TXT support as the first platform
> > for Linux Secure Launch.
>
> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it
> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the
> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already.
>
> Can we make progress on this please?

So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches:

- 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tree
  is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe this
  is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from that
  angle.
- 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before 15/20.
- 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining how the
  locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest of
  the patch set.
- 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set locality
  to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of this.
  Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just checking)?

>
> Thanks,
>
>         tglx

BR, Jarkko

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