linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

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Message-Id: <D5AF4HY1I6AA.27WRBDDGLYH39@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2024 02:33:30 +0200
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "Ross Philipson"
 <ross.philipson@...cle.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
 <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
 <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
 <kexec@...ts.infradead.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
 <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com>, <mingo@...hat.com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
 <hpa@...or.com>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <ardb@...nel.org>,
 <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
 <peterhuewe@....de>, <jgg@...pe.ca>, <luto@...capital.net>,
 <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>, <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
 <davem@...emloft.net>, <corbet@....net>, <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
 <dwmw2@...radead.org>, <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
 <kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com>, <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
 <trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux
 kernel support

On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 1:08 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 00:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> >> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it
> >> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the
> >> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already.
> >>
> >> Can we make progress on this please?
> >
> > So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches:
> >
> > - 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tree
> >   is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe this
> >   is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from that
> >   angle.
> > - 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before 15/20.
> > - 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining how the
> >   locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest of
> >   the patch set.
> > - 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set locality
> >   to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of this.
> >   Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just checking)?
>
> Can you please explicitely voice your detailed technical concerns in
> replies to the actual patches?

- 15/20 looks like a rigged patch. I don't really know why it is done
  so it is hard to either suggest how "resolve it".
- 16/20 probably makes sense but if it is a bug fix or part of it is,
  the bug fix should have relevant fixes etc tags so that it can be
  picked up to stable kernels.
- 17-18/20: I'd speak about this as the "one whole" i.e. here the
  privilege to be able change locality during run-time is really
  concerning. Could the locality be figured out for the kernel
  command-line instead? The sysfs attribute can exist as read-only.

So yeah, the way I see it 15-16 are the more trivial issue to sort
out (probably) but with 17-18 we have an actual architectural concern
for kernel overall.

> Thanks,
>
>         tglx

BR, Jarkko