linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] futex: Create set_robust

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Message-ID: <20241105121837.GI24862@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 13:18:37 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
Cc: André Almeida <andrealmeid@...lia.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@...olabs.net>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	sonicadvance1@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-dev@...lia.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] futex: Create set_robust_list2

On Mon, Nov 04, 2024 at 01:36:43PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Peter Zijlstra:
> 
> > On Sat, Nov 02, 2024 at 10:58:42PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> >
> >> QEMU hints towards further problems (in linux-user/syscall.c):
> >> 
> >>     case TARGET_NR_set_robust_list:
> >>     case TARGET_NR_get_robust_list:
> >>         /* The ABI for supporting robust futexes has userspace pass
> >>          * the kernel a pointer to a linked list which is updated by
> >>          * userspace after the syscall; the list is walked by the kernel
> >>          * when the thread exits. Since the linked list in QEMU guest
> >>          * memory isn't a valid linked list for the host and we have
> >>          * no way to reliably intercept the thread-death event, we can't
> >>          * support these. Silently return ENOSYS so that guest userspace
> >>          * falls back to a non-robust futex implementation (which should
> >>          * be OK except in the corner case of the guest crashing while
> >>          * holding a mutex that is shared with another process via
> >>          * shared memory).
> >>          */
> >>         return -TARGET_ENOSYS;
> >
> > I don't think we can sanely fix that. Can't QEMU track the robust thing
> > itself and use waitpid() to discover the thread is gone and fudge things
> > from there?
> 
> There are race conditions with munmap, I think, and they probably get a
> lot of worse if QEMU does that.
> 
> See Rich Felker's bug report:
> 
> | The corruption is performed by the kernel when it walks the robust
> | list. The basic situation is the same as in PR #13690, except that
> | here there's actually a potential write to the memory rather than just
> | a read.
> | 
> | The sequence of events leading to corruption goes like this:
> | 
> | 1. Thread A unlocks the process-shared, robust mutex and is preempted
> |    after the mutex is removed from the robust list and atomically
> |    unlocked, but before it's removed from the list_op_pending field of
> |    the robust list header.
> | 
> | 2. Thread B locks the mutex, and, knowing by program logic that it's
> |    the last user of the mutex, unlocks and unmaps it, allocates/maps
> |    something else that gets assigned the same address as the shared mutex
> |    mapping, and then exits.
> | 
> | 3. The kernel destroys the process, which involves walking each
> |   thread's robust list and processing each thread's list_op_pending
> |   field of the robust list header. Since thread A has a list_op_pending
> |   pointing at the address previously occupied by the mutex, the kernel
> |   obliviously "unlocks the mutex" by writing a 0 to the address and
> |   futex-waking it. However, the kernel has instead overwritten part of
> |   whatever mapping thread A created. If this is private memory it
> |   (probably) doesn't matter since the process is ending anyway (but are
> |   there race conditions where this can be seen?). If this is shared
> |   memory or a shared file mapping, however, the kernel corrupts it.
> | 
> | I suspect the race is difficult to hit since thread A has to get
> | preempted at exactly the wrong time AND thread B has to do a fair
> | amount of work without thread A getting scheduled again. So I'm not
> | sure how much luck we'd have getting a test case.
> 
> 
> <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14485#c3>

So I've only managed to conjure up two horrible solutions for this:

 - put the robust futex operations under user-space RCU, and mandate a
   matching synchronize_rcu() before any munmap() calls.

 - add a robust-barrier syscall that waits until all list_op_pending are
   either NULL or changed since invocation. And mandate this call before
   munmap().

Neither are particularly pretty I admit, but at least they should work.

But doing this and mandating the alignment thing should at least make
this qemu thing workable, no?

> We also have a silent unlocking failure because userspace does not know
> about ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT:
> 
>   Bug 19089 - Robust mutexes do not take ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT into account
>   <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=19089>
> 
> (I think we may have discussed this one before, and you may have
> suggested to just hard-code 2048 in userspace because the constant is
> not expected to change.)
> 
> So the in-mutex linked list has quite a few problems even outside of
> emulation. 8-(

It's futex, ofcourse its a pain in the arse :-)

And yeah, no better ideas on that limit for now...