linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Allow the TPM2 pcr_extend HMAC capability to be disabled on boot

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Message-Id: <D5FI94F98BS0.2JMJGMV9W5GBC@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2024 02:03:56 +0200
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Mimi Zohar" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, "James Bottomley"
 <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, <mapengyu@...il.com>, "Paul Moore"
 <paul@...l-moore.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
 <christian@...sel.eu>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Allow the TPM2 pcr_extend HMAC capability to
 be disabled on boot

On Thu Nov 7, 2024 at 1:52 AM EET, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2024-11-07 at 01:22 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu Nov 7, 2024 at 12:52 AM EET, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > 
> > > I'm a bit confused here.  It's TPM2_PCR_Extend we have the trouble with
> > > (as Mimi says in her email that you quoted) not TPM2_GetRandom.
> > > 
> > > The random number generator reseed occurs in a kernel thread that fires
> > > about once a minute, so it doesn't show up in really any of the boot
> > > timings.  Plus even with sessions added, what there now isn't a
> > > significant overhead even to the running kernel given it's asynchronous
> > > and called infrequently.
> > 
> > Ah, right then we need the boot flag, and my earlier comments to the
> > parameter apply. I've never used IMA so I don't actually even know in
> > detail how it is using TPM.
>
> Huh?  A simple explanation is that IMA-measurement maintains a measurement list,
> similar to the pre-boot event log.  Each IMA-measurement record extends the TPM
> PCR (default PCR 10).
>
> Assuming IMA is enabled in the kernel, then just add "ima_policy=tcb" or
> "ima_policy=critical_data" on the boot command line.  To view the measurement
> records, cat <securityfs>/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements.  Normally
> the IMA policy specified on the boot command line is replaced with a finer
> grained custom policy.

I'll try to figure out how to test it regularly. And yeah we need the
flag obviously.

I have my (CI compatible) framework that I run regularly with upstream
that I've mentioned a few times earlier.

https://codeberg.org/jarkko/linux-tpmdd-test

How would I would make all files in /etc get to get the checksums, and
how can I generate legit and illegit change to some file in that tree?

No need to address how to implement that to my framework, I can figure
that out. I just would love throw something so that any performance
regressions will be catched right at the get go, i.e. before they
end up to the mainline.

> Mimi

BR, Jarkko