linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] TFrom: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com0

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Message-ID: <20241112181747.GA21568@skinsburskii.>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 10:17:47 -0800
From: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com
Cc: kys@...rosoft.com, haiyangz@...rosoft.com, wei.liu@...nel.org,
	decui@...rosoft.com, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
	linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] TFrom: Stanislav Kinsburskii
 <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com0

Please disregard.

Stanislav

On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 06:16:26PM +0000, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
> x86/hyperv: Set X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE unconditionally
> 
> Enable X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE by default as X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE is
> independent from invariant TSC and should have never been gated by the
> HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege.
> 
> To elaborate, the HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege allows certain types of
> guests to opt-in to invariant TSC by writing the
> HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL register. Not all guests will have this
> privilege and the hypervisor will automatically opt-in certain types of
> guests (e.g. EXO partitions) to invariant TSC, but this functionality is
> unrelated to the TSC reliability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c |    6 +++---
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> index d18078834ded..14412afcc398 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
>  	machine_ops.crash_shutdown = hv_machine_crash_shutdown;
>  #endif
>  #endif
> -	if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT) {
> +	if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT)
>  		/*
>  		 * Writing to synthetic MSR 0x40000118 updates/changes the
>  		 * guest visible CPUIDs. Setting bit 0 of this MSR  enables
> @@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
>  		 * is called.
>  		 */
>  		wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL, HV_EXPOSE_INVARIANT_TSC);
> -		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
> -	}
> +
> +	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Generation 2 instances don't support reading the NMI status from
>