linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH] x86/hyperv: Set X86_FEATURE_TSC

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Message-ID:
 <SN6PR02MB41575A98314B82C498A3D312D4592@SN6PR02MB4157.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 19:48:06 +0000
From: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@...look.com>
To: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "mingo@...hat.com"
	<mingo@...hat.com>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
	"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
CC: "kys@...rosoft.com" <kys@...rosoft.com>, "haiyangz@...rosoft.com"
	<haiyangz@...rosoft.com>, "wei.liu@...nel.org" <wei.liu@...nel.org>,
	"decui@...rosoft.com" <decui@...rosoft.com>, "x86@...nel.org"
	<x86@...nel.org>, "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] x86/hyperv: Set X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE unconditionally

From: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2024 10:18 AM
> 
> Enable X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE by default as X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE is
> independent from invariant TSC and should have never been gated by the
> HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege.

I think originally X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE was gated by the Hyper-V
TSC Invariant feature because otherwise VM live migration may cause
the TSC value reported by the RDTSC/RDTSCP instruction in the guest
to abruptly change frequency and value. In such cases, the TSC isn't
useable by the kernel or user space.

Enabling the Hyper-V TSC Invariant feature fixes that by using the
hardware scaling available in more recent processors to automatically
fixup the TSC value returned by RDTSC/RDTSCP in the guest.

Is there a practical problem that is fixed by always enabling
X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE?

Michael

> 
> To elaborate, the HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege allows certain types of
> guests to opt-in to invariant TSC by writing the
> HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL register. Not all guests will have this
> privilege and the hypervisor will automatically opt-in certain types of
> guests (e.g. EXO partitions) to invariant TSC, but this functionality is
> unrelated to the TSC reliability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@...ux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c |    6 +++---
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> index d18078834ded..14412afcc398 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
>  	machine_ops.crash_shutdown = hv_machine_crash_shutdown;
>  #endif
>  #endif
> -	if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT) {
> +	if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT)
>  		/*
>  		 * Writing to synthetic MSR 0x40000118 updates/changes the
>  		 * guest visible CPUIDs. Setting bit 0 of this MSR  enables
> @@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
>  		 * is called.
>  		 */
>  		wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL, HV_EXPOSE_INVARIANT_TSC);
> -		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
> -	}
> +
> +	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
> 
>  	/*
>  	 * Generation 2 instances don't support reading the NMI status from
> 
>