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Message-ID: <af2a2a7e-1604-4e24-bee6-f31498e0b25d@wangsu.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 10:35:48 +0800
From: Lin Feng <linf@...gsu.com>
To: nicolas.bouchinet@...p-os.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-serial@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org>, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
Joel Granados <j.granados@...sung.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] coredump: Fixes core_pipe_limit sysctl proc_handler
Hi,
see comments below please.
On 11/12/24 21:13, nicolas.bouchinet@...p-os.org wrote:
> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>
>
> proc_dointvec converts a string to a vector of signed int, which is
> stored in the unsigned int .data core_pipe_limit.
> It was thus authorized to write a negative value to core_pipe_limit
> sysctl which once stored in core_pipe_limit, leads to the signed int
> dump_count check against core_pipe_limit never be true. The same can be
> achieved with core_pipe_limit set to INT_MAX.
>
> Any negative write or >= to INT_MAX in core_pipe_limit sysctl would
> hypothetically allow a user to create very high load on the system by
> running processes that produces a coredump in case the core_pattern
> sysctl is configured to pipe core files to user space helper.
> Memory or PID exhaustion should happen before but it anyway breaks the
> core_pipe_limit semantic
>
> This commit fixes this by changing core_pipe_limit sysctl's proc_handler
> to proc_dointvec_minmax and bound checking between SYSCTL_ZERO and
> SYSCTL_INT_MAX.
>
> Fixes: a293980c2e26 ("exec: let do_coredump() limit the number of concurrent dumps to pipes")
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>
> ---
> fs/coredump.c | 7 +++++--
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> index 7f12ff6ad1d3e..8ea5896e518dd 100644
> --- a/fs/coredump.c
> +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> @@ -616,7 +616,8 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
> cprm.limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
>
> dump_count = atomic_inc_return(&core_dump_count);
> - if (core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) {
> + if ((core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) ||
> + (core_pipe_limit && dump_count == INT_MAX)) {
While comparing between 'unsigned int' and 'signed int', C deems them both
to 'unsigned int', so as an insane user sets core_pipe_limit to INT_MAX,
and dump_count(signed int) does overflow INT_MAX, checking for
'core_pipe_limit < dump_count' is passed, thus codes skips core dump.
So IMO it's enough after changing proc_handler to proc_dointvec_minmax.
Others in this patch:
Reviewed-by: Lin Feng <linf@...gsu.com>
> printk(KERN_WARNING "Pid %d(%s) over core_pipe_limit\n",
> task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
> printk(KERN_WARNING "Skipping core dump\n");
> @@ -1024,7 +1025,9 @@ static struct ctl_table coredump_sysctls[] = {
> .data = &core_pipe_limit,
> .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
> .mode = 0644,
> - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
> + .extra2 = SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
> },
> {
> .procname = "core_file_note_size_limit",
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