linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre

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Message-ID:
 <LV3PR12MB9265747DB95F1F54E826A971945B2@LV3PR12MB9265.namprd12.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 15:36:44 +0000
From: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@....com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation

[AMD Official Use Only - AMD Internal Distribution Only]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
> Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2024 12:57 AM
> To: Kaplan, David <David.Kaplan@....com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>; Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>; Peter
> Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>; Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>; Ingo
> Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>; Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>;
> x86@...nel.org; H . Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation
>
> Caution: This message originated from an External Source. Use proper caution
> when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding.
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 03:54:31PM -0600, David Kaplan wrote:
> >  static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
> >  {
> > -     if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
> > +     if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) ||
> > + cpu_mitigations_off())
> >               spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void) {
> > +     if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) ||
> > +cpu_mitigations_off())
>
> We probably don't need to repeat this check, is this okay:
>
>         if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE)
> >               return;
> > -     }
> >
> >       if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {

I don't think so.  That would stop us from printing the message about the system being vulnerable at the end of the function.

We should only not print the message I believe if the CPU is actually not vulnerable or mitigations are globally disabled.  Although now I realize my patches may not be suppressing the print statements always if cpu_mitigations_off(), so I need to go and fix that.

--David Kaplan