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Message-ID: <20241114234104.128532-6-pratikrajesh.sampat@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 17:41:01 -0600
From: "Pratik R. Sampat" <pratikrajesh.sampat@....com>
To: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>, <pgonda@...gle.com>,
<thomas.lendacky@....com>, <michael.roth@....com>, <shuah@...nel.org>,
<linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<sos-linux-ext-patches@...lman-svr.amd.com>, <pratikrajesh.sampat@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/8] KVM: selftests: Add library support for interacting with SNP
Extend the SEV library to include support for SNP ioctl() wrappers,
which aid in launching and interacting with a SEV-SNP guest.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <pratikrajesh.sampat@....com>
---
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 49 ++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
index faed91435963..19454b0e10a6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -22,9 +22,20 @@ enum sev_guest_state {
SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING,
};
+/* Minimum firmware version required for the SEV-SNP support */
+#define SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR 1
+#define SNP_MIN_API_MINOR 51
+
#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
+#define SNP_POLICY_SMT (1ULL << 16)
+#define SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO (1ULL << 17)
+#define SNP_POLICY_DBG (1ULL << 19)
+
+#define SNP_FW_VER_MINOR(min) ((uint8_t)(min) << 0)
+#define SNP_FW_VER_MAJOR(maj) ((uint8_t)(maj) << 8)
+
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ 0x100
#define VMGEXIT() { __asm__ __volatile__("rep; vmmcall"); }
@@ -36,13 +47,35 @@ bool is_sev_snp_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy);
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
struct kvm_vcpu **cpu);
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
+/*
+ * A SEV-SNP VM requires the policy default bit to always be set.
+ * The SMT policy bit is also required to be set based on SMT being
+ * available and active on the system.
+ */
+static inline u64 snp_default_policy(void)
+{
+ bool smt_active = false;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ f = fopen("/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active", "r");
+ if (f) {
+ smt_active = fgetc(f) - '0';
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+
+ return SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO | (smt_active ? SNP_POLICY_SMT : 0);
+}
+
/*
* The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP uAPI is utter garbage and takes an "unsigned long"
* instead of a proper struct. The size of the parameter is embedded in the
@@ -76,6 +109,7 @@ kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
static inline void sev_register_encrypted_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm,
struct userspace_mem_region *region)
@@ -99,4 +133,17 @@ static inline void sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update_data);
}
+static inline void snp_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
+ uint64_t hva, uint64_t size, uint8_t type)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update_data = {
+ .uaddr = hva,
+ .gfn_start = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+ .len = size,
+ .type = type,
+ };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &update_data);
+}
+
#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
index d6e7a422b69d..40b90d3a5769 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
* and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition
* expression would cause us to quit the loop.
*/
-static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region,
+ uint8_t page_type)
{
const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
@@ -41,16 +42,39 @@ static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *regio
if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages))
return;
- sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
+ if (!is_sev_snp_vm(vm))
+ sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
+ if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm)) {
+ snp_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset,
+ (uint64_t)addr_gpa2hva(vm, gpa_base + offset),
+ size, page_type);
+ continue;
+ }
+
sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
}
}
+static void privatize_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+{
+ const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
+ const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
+ const sparsebit_idx_t lowest_page_in_region = gpa_base >> vm->page_shift;
+ sparsebit_idx_t i, j;
+
+ sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
+ const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
+ const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
+
+ vm_mem_set_private(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+ }
+}
+
void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
{
if (vm->type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
@@ -77,6 +101,14 @@ void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
}
}
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+
+ assert(vm->type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+}
+
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
{
struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
@@ -93,7 +125,7 @@ void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
- encrypt_region(vm, region);
+ encrypt_region(vm, region, 0);
if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
@@ -129,6 +161,35 @@ void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
}
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start launch_start = {
+ .policy = policy,
+ };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+ int ctr;
+
+ hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node) {
+ privatize_region(vm, region);
+ encrypt_region(vm, region, KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ }
+
+ vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true;
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish launch_finish = { 0 };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, &launch_finish);
+}
+
struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
{
@@ -145,8 +206,20 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
return vm;
}
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
{
+ if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm)) {
+ vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL, (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE));
+
+ snp_vm_launch_start(vm, policy);
+
+ snp_vm_launch_update(vm);
+
+ snp_vm_launch_finish(vm);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
if (!measurement)
--
2.43.0
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