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Message-ID: <20241114-olive-petrel-of-culture-5ae519-mkl@pengutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 14:34:24 +0100
From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
To: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@...adoo.fr>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>, Max Staudt <max@...as.org>, 
	Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@...n.ch>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, 
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, 
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, linux-can@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] can: can327: fix snprintf() limit in
 can327_handle_prompt()

On 14.11.2024 21:35:07, Vincent Mailhol wrote:
> On 14/11/2024 at 18:57, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 06:34:49PM +0900, Vincent Mailhol wrote:
> > > Hi Dan,
> > > 
> > > On 14/11/2024 at 18:03, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > > > This code is printing hex values to the &local_txbuf buffer and it's
> > > > using the snprintf() function to try prevent buffer overflows.  The
> > > > problem is that it's not passing the correct limit to the snprintf()
> > > > function so the limit doesn't do anything.  On each iteration we print
> > > > two digits so the remaining size should also decrease by two, but
> > > > instead it passes the sizeof() the entire buffer each time.
> > > > 
> > > > If the frame->len were too long it would result in a buffer overflow.
> > > 
> > > But, can frame->len be too long? Classical CAN frame maximum length is 8
> > > bytes. And I do not see a path for a malformed frame to reach this part of
> > > the driver.
> > > 
> > > If such a path exists, I think this should be explained. Else, I am just not
> > > sure if this needs a Fixes: tag.
> 
> I confirmed the CAN frame length is correctly checked.
> 
> The only way to trigger that snprintf() with the wrong size is if
> CAN327_TX_DO_CAN_DATA is set, which only occurs in can327_send_frame(). And
> the only caller of can327_send_frame() is can327_netdev_start_xmit().
> 
> can327_netdev_start_xmit() calls can_dev_dropped_skb() which in turn calls
> can_dropped_invalid_skb() which goes to can_is_can_skb() which finally
> checks that cf->len is not bigger than CAN_MAX_DLEN (i.e. 8 bytes).
> 
> So indeed, no buffer overflow can occur here.
> 
> > Even when bugs don't affect runtime we still assign a Fixes tag, but we don't
> > CC stable.  There is no way that passing the wrong size was intentional.
> 
> Got it. Thanks for the explanation, now it makes sense to keep the Fixes:
> tag.

Should we take the patch as it is?

regards,
Marc

-- 
Pengutronix e.K.                 | Marc Kleine-Budde          |
Embedded Linux                   | https://www.pengutronix.de |
Vertretung Nürnberg              | Phone: +49-5121-206917-129 |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-9   |

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