linux-kernel - [PATCH] drm/msm/gem: prevent integer overflow in msm_ioctl_gem

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Message-ID: <7c1e6300-8eb3-4d10-8ec5-51df5d9149a0@stanley.mountain>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 17:50:08 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
To: Rob Clark <robdclark@...il.com>
Cc: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@...cinc.com>,
	Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@...aro.org>,
	Sean Paul <sean@...rly.run>,
	Marijn Suijten <marijn.suijten@...ainline.org>,
	David Airlie <airlied@...il.com>, Simona Vetter <simona@...ll.ch>,
	linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org, dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org,
	freedreno@...ts.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] drm/msm/gem: prevent integer overflow in
 msm_ioctl_gem_submit()

The "submit->cmd[i].size" and "submit->cmd[i].offset" variables are u32
values that come from the user via the submit_lookup_cmds() function.
This addition could lead to an integer wrapping bug so use size_add()
to prevent that.

Fixes: 198725337ef1 ("drm/msm: fix cmdstream size check")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_submit.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_submit.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_submit.c
index fba78193127d..f775638d239a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_submit.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_submit.c
@@ -787,8 +787,7 @@ int msm_ioctl_gem_submit(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 			goto out;
 
 		if (!submit->cmd[i].size ||
-			((submit->cmd[i].size + submit->cmd[i].offset) >
-				obj->size / 4)) {
+		    (size_add(submit->cmd[i].size, submit->cmd[i].offset) > obj->size / 4)) {
 			SUBMIT_ERROR(submit, "invalid cmdstream size: %u\n", submit->cmd[i].size * 4);
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
-- 
2.45.2