linux-kernel - Re: [RFCv1 0/6] Page Detective

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Message-ID: <CA+CK2bD88y4wmmvzMCC5Zkp4DX5ZrxL+XEOX2v4UhBxet6nwSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2024 10:08:36 -0500
From: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...een.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
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Subject: Re: [RFCv1 0/6] Page Detective

On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 8:09 PM Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 05:08:42PM -0500, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> > Additionally, using crash/drgn is not feasible for us at this time, it
> > requires keeping external tools on our hosts, also it requires
> > approval and a security review for each script before deployment in
> > our fleet.
>
> So it's ok to add a totally insecure kernel feature to your fleet
> instead?  You might want to reconsider that policy decision :)

Hi Greg,

While some risk is inherent, we believe the potential for abuse here
is limited, especially given the existing  CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement.
But, even with root access compromised, this tool presents a smaller
attack surface than alternatives like crash/drgn. It exposes less
sensitive information, unlike crash/drgn, which could potentially
allow reading all of kernel memory.

Pasha