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Message-ID: <CAJD7tkaYuJpxijOp6se+mWHO6djaz_7KaoXjf=Rdo6nJubwB2w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2024 09:33:18 -0800
From: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@...gle.com>
To: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...een.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
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Subject: Re: [RFCv1 0/6] Page Detective
On Wed, Nov 20, 2024 at 8:14 AM Pasha Tatashin
<pasha.tatashin@...een.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 2:36 PM Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 11:30 AM Pasha Tatashin
> > <pasha.tatashin@...een.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 1:23 PM Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 10:08:36AM -0500, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> > > > > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 8:09 PM Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 05:08:42PM -0500, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> > > > > > > Additionally, using crash/drgn is not feasible for us at this time, it
> > > > > > > requires keeping external tools on our hosts, also it requires
> > > > > > > approval and a security review for each script before deployment in
> > > > > > > our fleet.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So it's ok to add a totally insecure kernel feature to your fleet
> > > > > > instead? You might want to reconsider that policy decision :)
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi Greg,
> > > > >
> > > > > While some risk is inherent, we believe the potential for abuse here
> > > > > is limited, especially given the existing CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement.
> > > > > But, even with root access compromised, this tool presents a smaller
> > > > > attack surface than alternatives like crash/drgn. It exposes less
> > > > > sensitive information, unlike crash/drgn, which could potentially
> > > > > allow reading all of kernel memory.
> > > >
> > > > The problem here is with using dmesg for output. No security-sensitive
> > > > information should go there. Even exposing raw kernel pointers is not
> > > > considered safe.
> > >
> > > I am OK in writing the output to a debugfs file in the next version,
> > > the only concern I have is that implies that dump_page() would need to
> > > be basically duplicated, as it now outputs everything via printk's.
> >
> > Perhaps you can refactor the code in dump_page() to use a seq_buf,
> > then have dump_page() printk that seq_buf using seq_buf_do_printk(),
> > and have page detective output that seq_buf to the debugfs file?
>
> Good idea, I will look into modifying it this way.
>
> > We do something very similar with memory_stat_format(). We use the
>
> void mem_cgroup_print_oom_meminfo(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
> {
> /* Use static buffer, for the caller is holding oom_lock. */
> static char buf[PAGE_SIZE];
> ....
> seq_buf_init(&s, buf, sizeof(buf));
> memory_stat_format(memcg, &s);
> seq_buf_do_printk(&s, KERN_INFO);
> }
>
> This is a callosal stack allocation, given that our fleet only has 8K
> stacks. :-)
That's a static allocation though :)
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