Message-ID: <20241120.oCee6eengie9@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2024 10:42:58 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, 
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, 
	Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>, Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>, 
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, 
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, 
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>, 
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, 
	Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, 
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, 
	Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, 
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>, 
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, 
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>, 
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, 
	Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, 
	Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, 
	Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, 
	Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, 
	Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, 
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v21 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
 EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits

On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 05:30:13PM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 12:06 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> >
> > The new SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and
> > their *_LOCKED counterparts are designed to be set by processes setting
> > up an execution environment, such as a user session, a container, or a
> > security sandbox.  Unlike other securebits, these ones can be set by
> > unprivileged processes.  Like seccomp filters or Landlock domains, the
> > securebits are inherited across processes.
> >
> > When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, programs interpreting code should
> > control executable resources according to execveat(2) + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> > (see previous commit).
> >
> > When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should deny
> > execution of user interactive commands (which excludes executable
> > regular files).
> >
> > Being able to configure each of these securebits enables system
> > administrators or owner of image containers to gradually validate the
> > related changes and to identify potential issues (e.g. with interpreter
> > or audit logs).
> >
> > It should be noted that unlike other security bits, the
> > SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE bits are
> > dedicated to user space willing to restrict itself.  Because of that,
> > they only make sense in the context of a trusted environment (e.g.
> > sandbox, container, user session, full system) where the process
> > changing its behavior (according to these bits) and all its parent
> > processes are trusted.  Otherwise, any parent process could just execute
> > its own malicious code (interpreting a script or not), or even enforce a
> > seccomp filter to mask these bits.
> >
> > Such a secure environment can be achieved with an appropriate access
> > control (e.g. mount's noexec option, file access rights, LSM policy) and
> > an enlighten ld.so checking that libraries are allowed for execution
> > e.g., to protect against illegitimate use of LD_PRELOAD.
> >
> > Ptrace restrictions according to these securebits would not make sense
> > because of the processes' trust assumption.
> >
> > Scripts may need some changes to deal with untrusted data (e.g. stdin,
> > environment variables), but that is outside the scope of the kernel.
> >
> > See chromeOS's documentation about script execution control and the
> > related threat model:
> > https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/guides/security/noexec-shell-scripts/
> >
> > Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
> > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112191858.162021-3-mic@digikod.net
> > ---
> >
> > Changes since v20:
> > * Move UAPI documentation to a dedicated RST file and format it.
> >
> > Changes since v19:
> > * Replace SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT with
> >   SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE:
> >   https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710.eiKohpa4Phai@digikod.net/
> > * Remove the ptrace restrictions, suggested by Andy.
> > * Improve documentation according to the discussion with Jeff.
> >
> > New design since v18:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220104155024.48023-3-mic@digikod.net
> > ---
> >  Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  include/uapi/linux/securebits.h            | 24 +++++-
> >  security/commoncap.c                       | 29 +++++--
> >  3 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> > index ad1aeaa5f6c0..1df5c7534af9 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> > @@ -2,6 +2,21 @@
> >  Executability check
> >  ===================
> >
> > +The ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` :manpage:`execveat(2)` flag, and the
> > +``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` securebits
> > +are intended for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to enforce a
> > +consistent execution security policy handled by the kernel.  See the
> > +`samples/check-exec/inc.c`_ example.
> > +
> > +Whether an interpreter should check these securebits or not depends on the
> > +security risk of running malicious scripts with respect to the execution
> > +environment, and whether the kernel can check if a script is trustworthy or
> > +not.  For instance, Python scripts running on a server can use arbitrary
> > +syscalls and access arbitrary files.  Such interpreters should then be
> > +enlighten to use these securebits and let users define their security policy.
> > +However, a JavaScript engine running in a web browser should already be
> > +sandboxed and then should not be able to harm the user's environment.
> > +
> >  AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> >  ===============
> >
> > @@ -32,3 +47,85 @@ be executable, which also requires integrity guarantees.
> >  To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues,
> >  ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` should be used with ``AT_EMPTY_PATH`` to check against a
> >  file descriptor instead of a path.
> > +
> > +SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE
> > +==========================================================
> > +
> > +When ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` is set, a process should only interpret or
> > +execute a file if a call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file
> > +descriptor and the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
> > +
> > +This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
> > +container runtimes, sandboxer tools...  Except for test environments, the
> > +related ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
> > +
> > +Programs should only enforce consistent restrictions according to the
> > +securebits but without relying on any other user-controlled configuration.
> > +Indeed, the use case for these securebits is to only trust executable code
> > +vetted by the system configuration (through the kernel), so we should be
> > +careful to not let untrusted users control this configuration.
> > +
> > +However, script interpreters may still use user configuration such as
> > +environment variables as long as it is not a way to disable the securebits
> > +checks.  For instance, the ``PATH`` and ``LD_PRELOAD`` variables can be set by
> > +a script's caller.  Changing these variables may lead to unintended code
> > +executions, but only from vetted executable programs, which is OK.  For this to
> > +make sense, the system should provide a consistent security policy to avoid
> > +arbitrary code execution e.g., by enforcing a write xor execute policy.
> > +
> > +When ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set, a process should never interpret
> > +interactive user commands (e.g. scripts).  However, if such commands are passed
> > +through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be interpreted if a
> > +call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file descriptor and the
> > +``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
> > +
> > +For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument
> > +should always deny such execution if ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set.
> > +
> > +This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
> > +container runtimes, sandboxer tools...  Except for test environments, the
> > +related ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
> > +
> > +Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to combination
> > +of any exec securebits:
> > +
> > +1. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
> > +
> > +   Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands (default).
> > +
> > +   No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of
> > +   potential issues thanks to the call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with
> > +   ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` which should always be performed but ignored by the
> > +   script interpreter.  Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems
> > +   administrators to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for
> > +   migration to a secure mode.
> > +
> > +2. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
> > +
> > +   Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow
> > +   arbitrary user commands.
> > +
> > +   The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not fooled)
> > +   users.  That can protect against unintended script executions (e.g. ``sh
> > +   /tmp/*.sh``).  This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.
> > +
> > +3. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
> > +
> > +   Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
> > +
> > +   This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without interactive
> > +   user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g.  with IMA/EVM or
> > +   dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be ready yet.  Indeed,
> > +   arbitrary interactive commands would be much more difficult to check.
> > +
> > +4. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
> > +
> > +   Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
> > +   any arbitrary user commands.
> > +
> > +   The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted code).
> > +   This makes sense for system services that may only execute trusted scripts.
> > +
> > +.. Links
> > +.. _samples/check-exec/inc.c:
> > +   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/samples/check-exec/inc.c
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> > index d6d98877ff1a..3fba30dbd68b 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> > @@ -52,10 +52,32 @@
> >  #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
> >                         (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
> >
> > +/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
> > +#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE              8
> > +#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED       9  /* make bit-8 immutable */
> > +
> > +#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE))
> > +#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \
> > +                       (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED))
> > +
> > +/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
> > +#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE           10
> > +#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED    11  /* make bit-10 immutable */
> > +
> > +#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE \
> > +                       (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> > +#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED \
> > +                       (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED))
> > +
> >  #define SECURE_ALL_BITS                (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
> >                                  issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
> >                                  issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
> > -                                issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
> > +                                issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) | \
> > +                                issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
> > +                                issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> >  #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS       (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
> >
> > +#define SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
> > +                                issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> > +
> >  #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > index cefad323a0b1..52ea01acb453 100644
> > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > @@ -1302,21 +1302,38 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> >                      & (old->securebits ^ arg2))                        /*[1]*/
> >                     || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
> >                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
> > -                   || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
> > -                                   current_cred()->user_ns,
> > -                                   CAP_SETPCAP,
> > -                                   CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0)                 /*[4]*/
> >                         /*
> >                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
> >                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
> >                          * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
> > -                        * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
> > -                        *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
> >                          */
> >                     )
> >                         /* cannot change a locked bit */
> >                         return -EPERM;
> >
> > +               /*
> > +                * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
> > +                * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
> > +                * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
> > +                * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
> > +                * itself.
> > +                */
> > +               if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
> > +                               CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
> > +                       const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
> > +                               SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
> > +                               SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
> > +                       const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
> > +
> > +                       /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
> > +                       if (!changed)
> > +                               return -EPERM;
> > +
> > +                       /* Denies privileged changes. */
> > +                       if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
> > +                               return -EPERM;
> > +               }
> > +
> Is above a refactor (without functional change) or a bug fix ?
> maybe a separate commit with description ?

As explained in the comments this is a change to allow unprivileged
securebits to be set, which is related to the CAP_SETPCAP check and
required by this patch.

> 
> >                 new = prepare_creds();
> >                 if (!new)
> >                         return -ENOMEM;
> > --
> > 2.47.0
> >
> >

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