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Message-ID: <CALOAHbCSTZz=FRDRjFW+eqssnpOAyq+UUi+KbYBR0crGHSB7qg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 10:14:44 +0800
From: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, mingo@...hat.com, arnd@...db.de, 
	x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] /dev/mem: Add a new parameter strict_devmem to bypass
 strict devmem

On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 11:23 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On 21.11.24 16:14, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 10:31:12PM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 4:51 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 20.11.24 13:28, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>> When CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is enabled, writing to /dev/mem to override
> >>>> kernel data for debugging purposes is prohibited. This configuration is
> >>>> always enabled on our production servers. However, there are times when we
> >>>> need to use the crash utility to modify kernel data to analyze complex
> >>>> issues.
> >>>>
> >>>> As suggested by Ingo, we can add a boot time knob of soft-enabling it.
> >>>> Therefore, a new parameter "strict_devmem=" is added. The reuslt are as
> >>>> follows,
> >>>>
> >>>> - Before this change
> >>>>     crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>     wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore      <<<< failed
> >>>>
> >>>> - After this change
> >>>>     - default
> >>>>       crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>       wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore    <<<< failed
> >>>>
> >>>>     - strict_devmem=off
> >>>>       crash> p panic_on_oops
> >>>>       panic_on_oops = $1 = 1
> >>>>       crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>       crash> p panic_on_oops
> >>>>       panic_on_oops = $2 = 0            <<<< succeeded
> >>>>
> >>>>     - strict_devmem=invalid
> >>>>       [    0.230052] Invalid option string for strict_devmem: 'invalid'
> >>>>       crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>       wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore  <<<< failed
> >>>>
> >>>> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
> >>>> ---
> >>>>    .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 16 ++++++++++++++
> >>>>    drivers/char/mem.c                            | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
> >>>>    2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>>> index 1518343bbe22..7fe0f66d0dfb 100644
> >>>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>>> @@ -6563,6 +6563,22 @@
> >>>>                        them frequently to increase the rate of SLB faults
> >>>>                        on kernel addresses.
> >>>>
> >>>> +     strict_devmem=
> >>>> +                     [KNL] Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, whether strict devmem
> >>>> +                     is enabled for this boot. Strict devmem checking is used
> >>>> +                     to protect the userspace (root) access to all of memory,
> >>>> +                     including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental access
> >>>> +                     to this is obviously disastrous, but specific access can
> >>>> +                     be used by people debugging the kernel. Note that with
> >>>> +                     PAT support enabled, even in this case there are
> >>>> +                     restrictions on /dev/mem use due to the cache aliasing
> >>>> +                     requirements.
> >>>> +             on      If IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, the /dev/mem file only allows
> >>>> +                     userspace access to PCI space and the BIOS code and data
> >>>> +                     regions. This is sufficient for dosemu and X and all
> >>>> +                     common users of /dev/mem. (default)
> >>>> +             off     Disable strict devmem checks.
> >>>> +
> >>>>        sunrpc.min_resvport=
> >>>>        sunrpc.max_resvport=
> >>>>                        [NFS,SUNRPC]
> >>>
> >>> This will allow to violate EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM, and I am afraid I don't
> >>> enjoy seeing devmem handling+config getting more complicated.
> >>
> >> That poses a challenge. Perhaps we should also consider disabling
> >> functions that rely on EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM when strict_devmem=off,
> >> but implementing such a change seems overly complex.
> >>
> >> Our primary goal is to temporarily bypass STRICT_DEVMEM for live
> >> kernel debugging. In an earlier version, I proposed making the
> >> fucntion devmem_is_allowed() error-injectable, but Ingo pointed out
> >> that it violates the principles of STRICT_DEVMEM.
> >
> > I think that "primary goal" is the problem here.  We don't want to do
> > that, at all, for all the reasons why we implemented STRICT_DEVMEM and
> > for why people enable it.
>
> +1
>
> >
> > Either you enable it because you want the protection and "security" it
> > provides, or you do not.  Don't try to work around it please.
> >
> >> Do you have any suggestions on enabling write access to /dev/mem in
> >> debugging tools like the crash utility, while maintaining
> >> compatibility with the existing rules?
> >
> > I think you just don't provide write access to /dev/mem for debugging
> > tools as it's a huge security hole that people realized and have plugged
> > up.  If you want to provide access to this for "debugging" then just
> > don't enable that option and live with the risk involved, I don't see
> > how you can have it both ways.
>
> Exactly. And I think a reasonable approach would be to have a debug
> kernel around into which you can boot, and make sure the debug kernel
> has such security features turned off.
>
> If you rely on distros, maybe you could convince the distro to ship the
> debug kernel with STRICT_DEVMEM off. I just checked RHEL9, and it only
> seems to be off in debug kernels on arm64 and s390x (IIUC). Maybe there
> is a reason we don't even want that off on debug kernels on x86_64, or
> nobody requested it so far, because using the crash utility with write
> access on a live system ... is a rather weird ... debugging mechanism in
> 2024 IMHO.

It seems I might be a bit outdated.
Could you share how you typically modify a live system these days? Are
you using live patching, writing kernel modules, or perhaps some
clever tools or techniques I'm not familiar with?

-- 
Regards
Yafang

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