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Message-ID: <CALOAHbCuZ7LWJZuYr8+z0OhnYGa-0bWAsFYr8_pDivghHsYBwg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 19:50:37 +0800
From: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, mingo@...hat.com, arnd@...db.de, 
	x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] /dev/mem: Add a new parameter strict_devmem to bypass
 strict devmem

On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 6:58 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On 22.11.24 03:14, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 11:23 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 21.11.24 16:14, Greg KH wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 10:31:12PM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 4:51 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 20.11.24 13:28, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>>>> When CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is enabled, writing to /dev/mem to override
> >>>>>> kernel data for debugging purposes is prohibited. This configuration is
> >>>>>> always enabled on our production servers. However, there are times when we
> >>>>>> need to use the crash utility to modify kernel data to analyze complex
> >>>>>> issues.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> As suggested by Ingo, we can add a boot time knob of soft-enabling it.
> >>>>>> Therefore, a new parameter "strict_devmem=" is added. The reuslt are as
> >>>>>> follows,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Before this change
> >>>>>>      crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>>>      wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore      <<<< failed
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - After this change
> >>>>>>      - default
> >>>>>>        crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>>>        wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore    <<<< failed
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>      - strict_devmem=off
> >>>>>>        crash> p panic_on_oops
> >>>>>>        panic_on_oops = $1 = 1
> >>>>>>        crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>>>        crash> p panic_on_oops
> >>>>>>        panic_on_oops = $2 = 0            <<<< succeeded
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>      - strict_devmem=invalid
> >>>>>>        [    0.230052] Invalid option string for strict_devmem: 'invalid'
> >>>>>>        crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
> >>>>>>        wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore  <<<< failed
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
> >>>>>> ---
> >>>>>>     .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 16 ++++++++++++++
> >>>>>>     drivers/char/mem.c                            | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
> >>>>>>     2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>>>>> index 1518343bbe22..7fe0f66d0dfb 100644
> >>>>>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>>>>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>>>>> @@ -6563,6 +6563,22 @@
> >>>>>>                         them frequently to increase the rate of SLB faults
> >>>>>>                         on kernel addresses.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> +     strict_devmem=
> >>>>>> +                     [KNL] Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, whether strict devmem
> >>>>>> +                     is enabled for this boot. Strict devmem checking is used
> >>>>>> +                     to protect the userspace (root) access to all of memory,
> >>>>>> +                     including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental access
> >>>>>> +                     to this is obviously disastrous, but specific access can
> >>>>>> +                     be used by people debugging the kernel. Note that with
> >>>>>> +                     PAT support enabled, even in this case there are
> >>>>>> +                     restrictions on /dev/mem use due to the cache aliasing
> >>>>>> +                     requirements.
> >>>>>> +             on      If IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, the /dev/mem file only allows
> >>>>>> +                     userspace access to PCI space and the BIOS code and data
> >>>>>> +                     regions. This is sufficient for dosemu and X and all
> >>>>>> +                     common users of /dev/mem. (default)
> >>>>>> +             off     Disable strict devmem checks.
> >>>>>> +
> >>>>>>         sunrpc.min_resvport=
> >>>>>>         sunrpc.max_resvport=
> >>>>>>                         [NFS,SUNRPC]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This will allow to violate EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM, and I am afraid I don't
> >>>>> enjoy seeing devmem handling+config getting more complicated.
> >>>>
> >>>> That poses a challenge. Perhaps we should also consider disabling
> >>>> functions that rely on EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM when strict_devmem=off,
> >>>> but implementing such a change seems overly complex.
> >>>>
> >>>> Our primary goal is to temporarily bypass STRICT_DEVMEM for live
> >>>> kernel debugging. In an earlier version, I proposed making the
> >>>> fucntion devmem_is_allowed() error-injectable, but Ingo pointed out
> >>>> that it violates the principles of STRICT_DEVMEM.
> >>>
> >>> I think that "primary goal" is the problem here.  We don't want to do
> >>> that, at all, for all the reasons why we implemented STRICT_DEVMEM and
> >>> for why people enable it.
> >>
> >> +1
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Either you enable it because you want the protection and "security" it
> >>> provides, or you do not.  Don't try to work around it please.
> >>>
> >>>> Do you have any suggestions on enabling write access to /dev/mem in
> >>>> debugging tools like the crash utility, while maintaining
> >>>> compatibility with the existing rules?
> >>>
> >>> I think you just don't provide write access to /dev/mem for debugging
> >>> tools as it's a huge security hole that people realized and have plugged
> >>> up.  If you want to provide access to this for "debugging" then just
> >>> don't enable that option and live with the risk involved, I don't see
> >>> how you can have it both ways.
> >>
> >> Exactly. And I think a reasonable approach would be to have a debug
> >> kernel around into which you can boot, and make sure the debug kernel
> >> has such security features turned off.
> >>
> >> If you rely on distros, maybe you could convince the distro to ship the
> >> debug kernel with STRICT_DEVMEM off. I just checked RHEL9, and it only
> >> seems to be off in debug kernels on arm64 and s390x (IIUC). Maybe there
> >> is a reason we don't even want that off on debug kernels on x86_64, or
> >> nobody requested it so far, because using the crash utility with write
> >> access on a live system ... is a rather weird ... debugging mechanism in
> >> 2024 IMHO.
> >
> > It seems I might be a bit outdated.
> > Could you share how you typically modify a live system these days? Are
> > you using live patching, writing kernel modules, or perhaps some
> > clever tools or techniques I'm not familiar with?
>
> I think modifying live systems is something people usually don't do
> anymore. The common debugging workflow is to use kdump and analyze it
> offline.
>
> I mean, people like me working for distributions analyze *a lot* of
> issues, and never really rely on /dev/mem or crash on a production
> system. Well, and apparently not even in debug kernels where some of
> them have STRICT_DEVMEM enabled.
>
> If you find yourself having to modify a live production system, you are
> probably something wrong.
>
> If you really want to modify your live system, there is kdb/kgdb.
> Alternatively, use a debug kernel where you disable security/safety
> mechanisms.

On a live system, you can experiment and try different approaches for
verification. However, with a dead system, you're left without any
options to test or debug.

In any case, thank you for your suggestion.

-- 
Regards
Yafang

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