linux-kernel - Re: [syzbot] [fs?] WARNING in minix

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Message-ID: <57995928-66c7-4612-8215-9f437816b586@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2024 11:19:13 +0530
From: Suraj Sonawane <surajsonawane0215@...il.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+320c57a47bdabc1f294b@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
 linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [fs?] WARNING in minix_unlink

On 11/25/24 08:30, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2024 at 08:10:09PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
>>> What happens there is that on a badly corrupt image we have an on-disk
>>> inode with link count below the actual number of links.  And after
>>> unlinks remove enough of those to drive the link count to 0, inode
>>> is freed.  After that point, all remaining links are pointing to a freed
>>> on-disk inode, which is discovered when they need to decrement of link
>>> count that is already 0.  Which does deserve a warning, probably without
>>> a stack trace.
>>>
>>> There's nothing the kernel can do about that, short of scanning the entire
>>> filesystem at mount time and verifying that link counts are accurate...
>>
>> Theoretically we could check if there's an associated dentry at the time of
>> decrement-to-0 and refuse to do that decrement in such case, marking the
>> in-core inode so that no extra dentries would be associated with it
>> from that point on.  Not sure if that'd make for a good mitigation strategy,
>> though - and it wouldn't help in case of extra links we hadn't seen by
>> that point; they would become dangling pointers and reuse of on-disk inode
>> would still be possible...
> 
> Yeah, what we do with ext4 in that case is that we mark the file
> system as corrupted, and print an ext4_error() message, but we don't
> call WARN_ON.  At this point, you cam either (a) force a reboot, so
> that it can get fixed up at fsck time --- this might be appropriate if
> you have a failover setup, where bringing the system *down* so the
> backup system can do its thing without further corrupting user data,
> (b) remount the file system read-only, so that you don't actually do
> any further damage to the system, or (c) if the file system is marked
> "don't worry, be happy, continue running because some silly security
> policy says that bringing the system down is a denial of service
> attack and we can't have that (**sigh**), it might be a good idea to
> mark the block group as "corrupted" and refuse to do any further block
> or inode allocations out of that block group until the file system can
> be properly checked.
> 
> Anyway, this is why I now ignore any syzkaller report that involves a
> badly corrupted file system being mounted.  That's not something I
> consider a valid threat model, and if someone wants to pay an engineer
> to work through all of those issues, *great*, but I don't have the
> time to deal with what I consider a super-low-priority issue.
> 
> 					- Ted


Thank you for the insight, Ted. I understand the challenges of 
addressing issues caused by badly corrupted filesystems, especially when 
they fall outside typical threat models. I appreciate your perspective 
and time!