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Message-ID: <Z0T_iPdmtpjrc14q@google.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2024 14:51:52 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
Cc: "binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com" <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>, "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, 
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, Yan Y Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>, 
	"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>, 
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>, 
	Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>, "dmatlack@...gle.com" <dmatlack@...gle.com>, 
	"nik.borisov@...e.com" <nik.borisov@...e.com>, 
	"tony.lindgren@...ux.intel.com" <tony.lindgren@...ux.intel.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, 
	Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] KVM: TDX: TD vcpu enter/exit

On Mon, Nov 25, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-11-25 at 07:19 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 25, 2024, Binbin Wu wrote:
> > > On 11/22/2024 4:14 AM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
> > > [...]
> > > >    - tdx_vcpu_enter_exit() calls guest_state_enter_irqoff()
> > > >      and guest_state_exit_irqoff() which comments say should be
> > > >      called from non-instrumentable code but noinst was removed
> > > >      at Sean's suggestion:
> > > >    	https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zg8tJspL9uBmMZFO@google.com/
> > > >      noinstr is also needed to retain NMI-blocking by avoiding
> > > >      instrumented code that leads to an IRET which unblocks NMIs.
> > > >      A later patch set will deal with NMI VM-exits.
> > > > 
> > > In https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zg8tJspL9uBmMZFO@google.com, Sean mentioned:
> > > "The reason the VM-Enter flows for VMX and SVM need to be noinstr is they do things
> > > like load the guest's CR2, and handle NMI VM-Exits with NMIs blocks.  None of
> > > that applies to TDX.  Either that, or there are some massive bugs lurking due to
> > > missing code."
> > > 
> > > I don't understand why handle NMI VM-Exits with NMIs blocks doesn't apply to
> > > TDX.  IIUIC, similar to VMX, TDX also needs to handle the NMI VM-exit in the
> > > noinstr section to avoid the unblock of NMIs due to instrumentation-induced
> > > fault.
> > 
> > With TDX, SEAMCALL is mechnically a VM-Exit.  KVM is the "guest" running in VMX
> > root mode, and the TDX-Module is the "host", running in SEAM root mode.
> > 
> > And for TDH.VP.ENTER, if a hardware NMI arrives with the TDX guest is active,
> > the initial NMI VM-Exit, which consumes the NMI and blocks further NMIs, goes
> > from SEAM non-root to SEAM root.  The SEAMRET from SEAM root to VMX root (KVM)
> > is effectively a VM-Enter, and does NOT block NMIs in VMX root (at least, AFAIK).
> > 
> > So trying to handle the NMI "exit" in a noinstr section is pointless because NMIs
> > are never blocked.
> 
> I thought NMI remains being blocked after SEAMRET?

No, because NMIs weren't blocked at SEAMCALL.

> The TDX CPU architecture extension spec says:
> 
> "
> On transition to SEAM VMX root operation, the processor can inhibit NMI and SMI.
> While inhibited, if these events occur, then they are tailored to stay pending
> and be delivered when the inhibit state is removed. NMI and external interrupts
> can be uninhibited in SEAM VMX-root operation. In SEAM VMX-root operation,
> MSR_INTR_PENDING can be read to help determine status of any pending events.
> 
> On transition to SEAM VMX non-root operation using a VM entry, NMI and INTR
> inhibit states are, by design, updated based on the configuration of the TD VMCS
> used to perform the VM entry.
> 
> ...
> 
> On transition to legacy VMX root operation using SEAMRET, the NMI and SMI
> inhibit state can be restored to the inhibit state at the time of the previous
> SEAMCALL and any pending NMI/SMI would be delivered if not inhibited.
> "
> 
> Here NMI is inhibited in SEAM VMX root, but is never inhibited in VMX root.  

Yep.

> And the last paragraph does say "any pending NMI would be delivered if not
> inhibited".  

That's referring to the scenario where an NMI becomes pending while the CPU is in
SEAM, i.e. has NMIs blocked.

> But I thought this applies to the case when "NMI happens in SEAM VMX root", but
> not "NMI happens in SEAM VMX non-root"?  I thought the NMI is already
> "delivered" when CPU is in "SEAM VMX non-root", but I guess I was wrong here..

When an NMI happens in non-root, the NMI is acknowledged by the CPU prior to
performing VM-Exit.  In regular VMX, NMIs are blocked after such VM-Exits.  With
TDX, that blocking happens for SEAM root, but the SEAMRET back to VMX root will
load interruptibility from the SEAMCALL VMCS, and I don't see any code in the
TDX-Module that propagates that blocking to SEAMCALL VMCS.

Hmm, actually, this means that TDX has a causality inversion, which may become
visible with FRED's NMI source reporting.  E.g. NMI X arrives in SEAM non-root
and triggers a VM-Exit.  NMI X+1 becomes pending while SEAM root is active.
TDX-Module SEAMRETs to VMX root, NMIs are unblocked, and so NMI X+1 is delivered
and handled before NMI X.

So the TDX-Module needs something like this:

diff --git a/src/td_transitions/td_exit.c b/src/td_transitions/td_exit.c
index eecfb2e..b5c17c3 100644
--- a/src/td_transitions/td_exit.c
+++ b/src/td_transitions/td_exit.c
@@ -527,6 +527,11 @@ void td_vmexit_to_vmm(uint8_t vcpu_state, uint8_t last_td_exit, uint64_t scrub_m
         load_xmms_by_mask(tdvps_ptr, xmm_select);
     }
 
+    if (<is NMI VM-Exit => SEAMRET)
+    {
+        set_guest_inter_blocking_by_nmi();
+    }
+
     // 7.   Run the common SEAMRET routine.
     tdx_vmm_post_dispatching();


and then KVM should indeed handle NMI exits prior to leaving the noinstr section.
 
> > TDX is also different because KVM isn't responsible for context switching guest
> > state.  Specifically, CR2 is managed by the TDX Module, and so there is no window
> > where KVM runs with guest CR2, and thus there is no risk of clobbering guest CR2
> > with a host value, e.g. due to take a #PF due instrumentation triggering something.
> > 
> > All that said, I did forget that code that runs between guest_state_enter_irqoff()
> > and guest_state_exit_irqoff() can't be instrumeneted.  And at least as of patch 2
> > in this series, the simplest way to make that happen is to tag tdx_vcpu_enter_exit()
> > as noinstr.  Just please make sure nothing else is added in the noinstr section
> > unless it absolutely needs to be there.
> 
> If NMI is not a concern, is below also an option?

No, because instrumentation needs to be prohibited for the entire time between
guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff().

> 	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
> 
> 	instructmentation_begin();
> 	tdh_vp_enter();
> 	instructmentation_end();
> 
> 	guest_state_exit_irqoff();
> 

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