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Message-Id: <20241126173844.29680-1-m.shachnai@rutgers.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 12:38:43 -0500
From: Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@...il.com>
To: ast@...nel.org
Cc: Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@...gers.edu>,
	Harishankar Vishwanathan <harishankar.vishwanathan@...il.com>,
	Srinivas Narayana <srinivas.narayana@...gers.edu>,
	Santosh Nagarakatte <santosh.nagarakatte@...gers.edu>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] bpf, verifier: Improve precision of BPF_MUL

This patch improves (or maintains) the precision of register value tracking
in BPF_MUL across all possible inputs. It also simplifies
scalar32_min_max_mul() and scalar_min_max_mul().

As it stands,BPF_MUL is composed of three functions:

case BPF_MUL:
  tnum_mul();
  scalar32_min_max_mul();
  scalar_min_max_mul();

The current implementation of scalar_min_max_mul() restricts the u64 input
ranges of dst_reg and src_reg to be within [0, U32_MAX]:

    /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
     * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
     */
    if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
        /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
        __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
        return;
    }

This restriction is done to avoid unsigned overflow, which could otherwise
wrap the result around 0, and leave an unsound output where umin > umax. We
also observe that limiting these u64 input ranges to [0, U32_MAX] leads to
a loss of precision. Consider the case where the u64 bounds of dst_reg are
[0, 2^34] and the u64 bounds of src_reg are [0, 2^2]. While the
multiplication of these two bounds doesn't overflow and is sound [0, 2^36],
the current scalar_min_max_mul() would set the entire register state to
unbounded.

The key idea of our patch is that if there’s no possibility of overflow, we
can multiply the unsigned bounds; otherwise, we set the 64-bit bounds to
[0, U64_MAX], marking them as unbounded.

if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax) ||
       (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin))) {
        /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
        dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
        dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
    }
  ...

Now, to update the signed bounds based on the unsigned bounds, we need to
ensure that the unsigned bounds don't cross the signed boundary (i.e., if
((s64)reg->umin_value <= (s64)reg->umax_value)). We observe that this is
done anyway by __reg_deduce_bounds later, so we can just set signed bounds
to unbounded [S64_MIN, S64_MAX]. Deferring the assignment of s64 bounds to
reg_bounds_sync removes the current redundancy in scalar_min_max_mul(),
which currently sets the s64 bounds based on the u64 bounds only in the
case where umin <= umax <= 2^(63)-1.

Below, we provide an example BPF program (below) that exhibits the
imprecision in the current BPF_MUL, where the outputs are all unbounded. In
contrast, the updated BPF_MUL produces a bounded register state:

BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_1, 11),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, 4503599627370624),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, 809591906117232263),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),

Verifier log using the old BPF_MUL:

func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (18) r1 = 0xb                      ; R1_w=11
2: (18) r2 = 0x10000000000080         ; R2_w=0x10000000000080
4: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
5: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
6: (5f) r1 &= r2                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R2_w=scalar()
7: (18) r3 = 0xb3c3f8c99262687        ; R3_w=0xb3c3f8c99262687
9: (2f) r3 *= r1                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R3_w=scalar()
...

Verifier using the new updated BPF_MUL (more precise bounds at label 9)

func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (18) r1 = 0xb                      ; R1_w=11
2: (18) r2 = 0x10000000000080         ; R2_w=0x10000000000080
4: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
5: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
6: (5f) r1 &= r2                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R2_w=scalar()
7: (18) r3 = 0xb3c3f8c99262687        ; R3_w=0xb3c3f8c99262687
9: (2f) r3 *= r1                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0x7b96bb0a94a3a7cd,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))
...

Finally, we proved the soundness of the new scalar_min_max_mul() and
scalar32_min_max_mul() functions. Typically, multiplication operations are
expensive to check with bitvector-based solvers. We were able to prove the
soundness of these functions using Non-Linear Integer Arithmetic (NIA)
theory. Additionally, using Agni [2,3], we obtained the encodings for
scalar32_min_max_mul() and scalar_min_max_mul() in bitvector theory, and
were able to prove their soundness using 16-bit bitvectors (instead of
64-bit bitvectors that the functions actually use).

In conclusion, with this patch,

1. We were able to show that we can improve the overall precision of
   BPF_MUL. We proved (using an SMT solver) that this new version of
   BPF_MUL is at least as precise as the current version for all inputs.

2. We are able to prove the soundness of the new scalar_min_max_mul() and
   scalar32_min_max_mul(). By leveraging the existing proof of tnum_mul
   [1], we can say that the composition of these three functions within
   BPF_MUL is sound.

[1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9741267
[2] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-37709-9_12
[3] https://people.cs.rutgers.edu/~sn349/papers/sas24-preprint.pdf

Co-developed-by: Harishankar Vishwanathan <harishankar.vishwanathan@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Harishankar Vishwanathan <harishankar.vishwanathan@...il.com>
Co-developed-by: Srinivas Narayana <srinivas.narayana@...gers.edu>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Narayana <srinivas.narayana@...gers.edu>
Co-developed-by: Santosh Nagarakatte <santosh.nagarakatte@...gers.edu>
Signed-off-by: Santosh Nagarakatte <santosh.nagarakatte@...gers.edu>
Signed-off-by: Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@...gers.edu>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 72 +++++++++++++++----------------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 1c4ebb326785..172816e8f1a4 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -13827,65 +13827,41 @@ static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
 {
-	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
-	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
-	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
+	u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value;
+	u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value;
 
-	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) {
-		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
-		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
-		return;
-	}
-	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
-	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX).
-	 */
-	if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) {
-		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
-		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
-		return;
-	}
-	dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val;
-	dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val;
-	if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) {
+	if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->u32_max_value, dst_umax) ||
+	    check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->u32_min_value, dst_umin)) {
 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
-		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
-		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
-	} else {
-		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
-		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
+		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
+		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
 	}
+
+	/* Set signed bounds to unbounded and improve precision in
+	 * reg_bounds_sync()
+	 */
+	dst_reg->smin_value = S32_MIN;
+	dst_reg->smax_value = S32_MAX;
 }
 
 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
 {
-	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
-	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
-	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
+	u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value;
+	u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value;
 
-	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
-		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
-		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
-		return;
-	}
-	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
-	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
-	 */
-	if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
-		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
-		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
-		return;
-	}
-	dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
-	dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
-	if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
+	if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax) ||
+	    check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin)) {
 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
-		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
-		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
-	} else {
-		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
-		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
+		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
+		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
 	}
+
+	/* Set signed bounds to unbounded and improve precision in
+	 * reg_bounds_sync()
+	 */
+	dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
+	dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
 }
 
 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
-- 
2.25.1


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