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Message-ID: <09567939-f5fb-4281-a912-7f8a6a07c3e5@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 17:36:06 +0100
From: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>
To: Song Chen <chensong_2000@....cn>
Cc: mcgrof@...nel.org, samitolvanen@...gle.com, da.gomez@...sung.com,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-modules@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kmod: verify module name before invoking modprobe

On 11/20/24 03:17, Song Chen wrote:
> Hi Petr,
> 
> 在 2024/11/18 20:54, Petr Pavlu 写道:
>> On 11/13/24 03:15, Song Chen wrote:
>>> 在 2024/11/12 20:56, Petr Pavlu 写道:
>>>> On 11/10/24 12:42, Song Chen wrote:
>>>>> Sometimes when kernel calls request_module to load a module
>>>>> into kernel space, it doesn't pass the module name appropriately,
>>>>> and request_module doesn't verify it as well.
>>>>>
>>>>> As a result, modprobe is invoked anyway and spend a lot of time
>>>>> searching a nonsense name.
>>>>>
>>>>> For example reported from a customer, he runs a user space process
>>>>> to call ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr), the callstack in kernel is
>>>>> like that:
>>>>> dev_ioctl(net/core/dev_iovtl.c)
>>>>>     dev_load
>>>>>        request_module("netdev-%s", name);
>>>>>        or request_module("%s", name);
>>>>>
>>>>> However if name of NIC is empty, neither dev_load nor request_module
>>>>> checks it at the first place, modprobe will search module "netdev-"
>>>>> in its default path, env path and path configured in etc for nothing,
>>>>> increase a lot system overhead.
>>>>>
>>>>> To address this problem, this patch copies va_list and introduces
>>>>> a helper is_module_name_valid to verify the parameters validity
>>>>> one by one, either null or empty. if it fails, no modprobe invoked.
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure if I fully follow why this should be addressed at the
>>>> request_module() level. If the user repeatedly invokes SIOCGIFINDEX with
>>>> an empty name and this increases their system load, wouldn't it be
>>>> better to update the userspace to prevent this non-sense request in the
>>>> first place?
>>>
>>> If the user process knew, it wouldn't make the mistake.
>>
>> The user process should be able to check that the ifr_name passed to
>> SIOCGIFINDEX is empty and avoid the syscall altogether, or am I missing
>> something? Even if the kernel gets improved in some way to handle this
>> case better, I would still suggest looking at what the application is
>> doing and how it ends up making this call.
>>
> 
> yes, agree, it's the user space process's fault after all.
> 
>>> moreover, what
>>> happened in dev_load was quite confusing, please see the code below:
>>>
>>>       no_module = !dev;
>>>       if (no_module && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
>>>           no_module = request_module("netdev-%s", name);
>>>       if (no_module && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
>>>           request_module("%s", name);
>>>
>>> Running the same process, sys admin or root user spends more time than
>>> normal user, it took a while for us to find the cause, that's why i
>>> tried to fix it in kernel.
>>>
>>> Similarly, if something should be done in the kernel,
>>>> wouldn't it be more straightforward for dev_ioctl()/dev_load() to check
>>>> this case?
>>>
>>> I thought about it at the beginning, not only dev_ioctl/dev_load but
>>> also other request_module callers should check this case as well, that
>>> would be too much effort, then I switched to check it at the beginning
>>> of request_module which every caller goes through.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think the same should in principle apply to other places that might
>>>> invoke request_module() with "%s" and a bogus value. The callers can
>>>> appropriately decide if their request makes sense and should be
>>>> fixed/improved.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Callees are obliged to do fault tolerance for callers, or at least let
>>> them know what is going on inside, what kinds of mistake they are
>>> making, there are a lot of such cases in kernel, such as call_modprobe
>>> in kernel/module/kmod.c, it checks if orig_module_name is NULL.
>>
>> Ok, I see the idea behind checking that a value passed to
>> request_module() to format "%s" is non-NULL.
>>
>> I'm however not sure about rejecting empty strings as is also done by
>> the patch. Consider a call to request_module("mod%s", suffix) where the
>> suffix could be empty to select the default variant, or non-empty to
>> select e.g. some optimized version of the module. Only the caller knows
>> if the suffix being empty is valid or not.
>>
>> I've checked if this pattern is currently used in the kernel and wasn't
>> able to find anything, so that is good. However, I'm not sure if
>> request_module() should flat-out reject this use.
>>
> 
> I accidentally found another problem in request_module when i was 
> testing this patch again, if the caller just passes a empty pointer to 
> request_module, like request_module(NULL), the process will be broken:
> 
> [    2.336160]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
> [    2.336160]  ? __pfx_crc64_rocksoft_notify+0x10/0x10
> [    2.336160]  ? vsnprintf+0x5a/0x4f0
> [    2.336160]  __request_module+0x93/0x2b0
> [    2.336160]  ? __pfx_crc64_rocksoft_notify+0x10/0x10
> [    2.336160]  ? notifier_call_chain+0x65/0xd0
> [    2.336160]  ? __pfx_crc64_rocksoft_notify+0x10/0x10
> [    2.336160]  crypto_probing_notify+0x43/0x60
> 
> (please ignore the caller, that is a testing code.)
> 
> I searched kernel code if this patter exists, and found in 
> __trace_bprintk of kernel/trace/trace_printk.c, it checks fmt at the 
> beginning of the function:
> 
>       va_list ap;
> 
>       if (unlikely(!fmt))
>           return 0;
> 
> Therefore, i would like to suggest we should at least add this check in 
> request_module too. In that sense, why don't we do a little further to 
> verify every parameter's validity to provide better fault tolerance, 
> besides, it costs almost nothing.
> 
> If you like this idea, i will send a v2.

I don't have much of a preference. It can be added, but on the other
hand I think it isn't really necessary. Most functions with format
arguments in the kernel don't perform this type of checking as far as
I can see.

-- 
Thanks,
Petr

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