linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH mm/stable] mm: fix vrealloc()'s KASAN poisoning logic

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Message-ID: <CAEf4BzZF8Gt_H=7J9SYXGorcjukQAqPJoX-a8vqBFdo73ZnXFA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 22:15:46 -0800
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org, urezki@...il.com, 
	hch@...radead.org, vbabka@...e.cz, dakr@...nel.org, mhocko@...e.com, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, ast@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH mm/stable] mm: fix vrealloc()'s KASAN poisoning logic

On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 4:58 PM Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 25 Nov 2024 16:52:06 -0800 Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> > When vrealloc() reuses already allocated vmap_area, we need to
> > re-annotate poisoned and unpoisoned portions of underlying memory
> > according to the new size.
>
> What are the consequences of this oversight?
>
> When fixing a flaw, please always remember to describe the visible
> effects of that flaw.
>

See [0] for false KASAN splat. I should have left a link to that, sorry.

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/67450f9b.050a0220.21d33d.0004.GAE@google.com/

> > Note, hard-coding KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL might not be exactly
> > correct, but KASAN flag logic is pretty involved and spread out
> > throughout __vmalloc_node_range_noprof(), so I'm using the bare minimum
> > flag here and leaving the rest to mm people to refactor this logic and
> > reuse it here.
> >
> > Fixes: 3ddc2fefe6f3 ("mm: vmalloc: implement vrealloc()")
>
> Because a cc:stable might be appropriate here.  But without knowing the
> effects, it's hard to determine this.

This is KASAN-related, so the effect is a KASAN mis-reporting issue
where there is none.

>
> > --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> > +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> > @@ -4093,7 +4093,8 @@ void *vrealloc_noprof(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> >               /* Zero out spare memory. */
> >               if (want_init_on_alloc(flags))
> >                       memset((void *)p + size, 0, old_size - size);
> > -
> > +             kasan_poison_vmalloc(p + size, old_size - size);
> > +             kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(p, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
> >               return (void *)p;
> >       }
> >
>