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Message-ID: <CAHijbEV6wtTQy01djSfWBJksq4AEoZ=KYUsaKEKNSXbTTSM-Ww@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 18:58:21 +0100
From: Julian Orth <ju.orth@...il.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd
 mappings read-only

(Re-sending the message below since I forgot to reply-all)

On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 6:46 PM Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 4:06 PM Lorenzo Stoakes
> <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com> wrote:
> > In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after
> > call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible
> > to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
> >
> > This was previously unnecessarily disallowed, despite the man page
> > documentation indicating that it would be, thereby limiting the usefulness
> > of F_SEAL_WRITE logic.
> >
> > We fixed this by adapting logic that existed for the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE
> > seal (one which disallows future writes to the memfd) to also be used for
> > F_SEAL_WRITE.
> >
> > For background - the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal clears VM_MAYWRITE for a
> > read-only mapping to disallow mprotect() from overriding the seal - an
> > operation performed by seal_check_write(), invoked from shmem_mmap(), the
> > f_op->mmap() hook used by shmem mappings.
> >
> > By extending this to F_SEAL_WRITE and critically - checking
> > mapping_map_writable() to determine if we may map the memfd AFTER we invoke
> > shmem_mmap() - the desired logic becomes possible. This is because
> > mapping_map_writable() explicitly checks for VM_MAYWRITE, which we will
> > have cleared.
> >
> > Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path
> > behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the
> > mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked,
> > thereby regressing this change.
> >
> > We reinstate this functionality by moving the check out of shmem_mmap() and
> > instead performing it in do_mmap() at the point at which VMA flags are
> > being determined, which seems in any case to be a more appropriate place in
> > which to make this determination.
> >
> > In order to achieve this we rework memfd seal logic to allow us access to
> > this information using existing logic and eliminate the clearing of
> > VM_MAYWRITE from seal_check_write() which we are performing in do_mmap()
> > instead.
>
> If we already check is_readonly_sealed() and strip VM_MAYWRITE in
> do_mmap(), without holding any kind of lock or counter on the file
> yet, then this check is clearly racy somehow, right? I think we have a
> race where we intermittently reject shared-readonly mmap() calls?

Apropos race, some time ago I reported a way to get a mutable mapping
for a write-sealed memfd via a race:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219106

>
> Like:
>
> process 1: calls mmap(PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE), checks is_readonly_sealed()
> process 2: adds a F_SEAL_WRITE seal
> process 1: enters mmap_region(), is_shared_maywrite() is true,
> mapping_map_writable() fails
>
> But even if we fix that, the same scenario would result in
> F_SEAL_WRITE randomly failing depending on the ordering, so it's not
> like we can actually do anything particularly sensible if these two
> operations race. Taking a step back, read-only shared mappings of
> F_SEAL_WRITE-sealed files are just kind of a bad idea because if
> someone first creates a read-only shared mapping and *then* tries to
> apply F_SEAL_WRITE, that won't work because the existing mapping will
> be VM_MAYWRITE.
>
> And the manpage is just misleading on interaction with shared mappings
> in general, it says "Using the F_ADD_SEALS operation to set the
> F_SEAL_WRITE seal fails with EBUSY if any writable, shared mapping
> exists" when actually, it more or less fails if any shared mapping
> exists at all.
>
> @Julian Orth: Did you report this regression because this change
> caused issues with existing userspace code?

I noticed this because it broke one of my testcases. It would also
affect production code but making that code work on pre-6.6 kernels is
probably a good idea anyway.

>
> > Reported-by: Julian Orth <ju.orth@...il.com>
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHijbEUMhvJTN9Xw1GmbM266FXXv=U7s4L_Jem5x3AaPZxrYpQ@mail.gmail.com/
> > Fixes: 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour")
> > Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>

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