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Message-ID: <20241128013424.4096668-40-seanjc@google.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 17:34:06 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@...group.com>, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
Kechen Lu <kechenl@...dia.com>, Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Robert Hoo <robert.hoo.linux@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 39/57] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap"
As the first step toward replacing KVM's so-called "governed features"
framework with a more comprehensive, less poorly named implementation,
replace the "kvm_governed_feature" function prefix with "guest_cpu_cap"
and rename guest_can_use() to guest_cpu_cap_has().
The "guest_cpu_cap" naming scheme mirrors that of "kvm_cpu_cap", and
provides a more clear distinction between guest capabilities, which are
KVM controlled (heh, or one might say "governed"), and guest CPUID, which
with few exceptions is fully userspace controlled.
Opportunistically rewrite the comment about XSS passthrough for SEV-ES
guests to avoid referencing so many functions, as such comments are prone
to becoming stale (case in point...).
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 17 ++++++++---------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++--
11 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index a13bf0ab417d..7b2fbb148661 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) :
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
if (allow_gbpages)
- kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
+ guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
if (best && apic) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index 5d0fe3793d75..e1b05da23cf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_is_governed_feature(unsigned int x86_feature)
return kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature) >= 0;
}
-static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned int x86_feature)
+static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
@@ -246,15 +246,15 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
}
-static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned int x86_feature)
+static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
{
if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(x86_feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, x86_feature))
- kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
+ guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
}
-static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned int x86_feature)
+static __always_inline bool guest_cpu_cap_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
{
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
cr3 &= ~(X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57);
return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, cr3);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index e9322358678b..caec3d11638d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_cr3_lam_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
return 0;
return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 22e7ad235123..d138560a9320 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5034,7 +5034,7 @@ static void reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(&context->guest_rsvd_check,
vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits,
context->cpu_role.base.level, is_efer_nx(context),
- guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+ guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
is_cr4_pse(context),
guest_cpuid_is_amd_compatible(vcpu));
}
@@ -5111,7 +5111,7 @@ static void reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(),
context->root_role.level,
context->root_role.efer_nx,
- guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+ guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
is_pse, is_amd);
if (!shadow_me_mask)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index b708bdf7eaff..d77b094d9a4d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static bool nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- if (!guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
return true;
if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DR);
}
- if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
/*
* Reserved bits of DEBUGCTL are ignored. Be consistent with
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
* exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
*/
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK))
int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
else
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
* what a nrips=0 CPU would do (L1 is responsible for advancing RIP
* prior to injecting the event).
*/
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb02->control.next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb02->control.next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
svm->soft_int_injected = true;
svm->soft_int_csbase = vmcb12_csbase;
svm->soft_int_old_rip = vmcb12_rip;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
svm->soft_int_next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
else
svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
@@ -728,18 +728,18 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext &
LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |=
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
pause_count12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count;
else
pause_count12 = 0;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
pause_thresh12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh;
else
pause_thresh12 = 0;
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (vmcb12->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(svm, vmcb12);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb12->control.next_rip = vmcb02->control.next_rip;
vmcb12->control.int_ctl = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl;
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
- if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02);
svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 72674b8825c4..4e5aba3f86cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -4458,16 +4458,15 @@ static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
* For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
* the host/guest supports its use.
*
- * guest_can_use() checks a number of requirements on the host/guest to
- * ensure that MSR_IA32_XSS is available, but it might report true even
- * if X86_FEATURE_XSAVES isn't configured in the guest to ensure host
- * MSR_IA32_XSS is always properly restored. For SEV-ES, it is better
- * to further check that the guest CPUID actually supports
- * X86_FEATURE_XSAVES so that accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS by misbehaved
- * guests will still get intercepted and caught in the normal
- * kvm_emulate_rdmsr()/kvm_emulated_wrmsr() paths.
+ * KVM treats the guest as being capable of using XSAVES even if XSAVES
+ * isn't enabled in guest CPUID as there is no intercept for XSAVES,
+ * i.e. the guest can use XSAVES/XRSTOR to read/write XSS if XSAVE is
+ * exposed to the guest and XSAVES is supported in hardware. Condition
+ * full XSS passthrough on the guest being able to use XSAVES *and*
+ * XSAVES being exposed to the guest so that KVM can at least honor
+ * guest CPUID for RDMSR and WRMSR.
*/
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1);
else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index dd15cc635655..f96c62a9d2c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
- (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
@@ -2864,7 +2864,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
switch (msr_info->index) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
+ !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
break;
@@ -3024,7 +3024,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
switch (ecx) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
if (!msr->host_initiated)
return 1;
@@ -3046,7 +3046,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
is_guest_mode(vcpu))
nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
@@ -4404,11 +4404,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
- kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+ guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
/*
* Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU model is Intel in order to emulate that
@@ -4416,12 +4416,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
*/
if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu))
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 43fa6a16eb19..6eff8c60d5eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ static inline bool svm_is_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
static inline bool nested_vgif_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+ return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
}
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static inline bool nested_npt_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
static inline bool nested_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
+ return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index aa78b6f38dfe..9aaa703f5f98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -6617,7 +6617,7 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
(vmx->nested.vmxon || vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)) {
kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr;
kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
@@ -6758,7 +6758,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return -EINVAL;
if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa))
@@ -6792,7 +6792,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return -EINVAL;
if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) &&
- (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
+ (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
!vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 893366e53732..ccba522246c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
break;
case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return 1;
if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
&msr_info->data))
@@ -2394,7 +2394,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
return 1; /* they are read-only */
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return 1;
return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
@@ -4591,7 +4591,7 @@ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
\
if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \
if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name)) \
- __enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
+ __enabled = guest_cpu_cap_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
else \
__enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\
@@ -7830,10 +7830,10 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
@@ -7841,7 +7841,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
@@ -7850,7 +7850,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 9f0ffc3289d2..1ee955cdb109 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != kvm_host.xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss);
}
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, kvm_host.xcr0);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != kvm_host.xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_host.xss);
}
--
2.47.0.338.g60cca15819-goog
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