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Message-ID: <20241129-work-pidfs-file_handle-v1-6-87d803a42495@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2024 14:38:05 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: Erin Shepherd <erin.shepherd@....eu>,
Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH RFC 6/6] pidfs: implement file handle support
On 64-bit platforms, userspace can read the pidfd's inode in order to
get a never-repeated PID identifier. On 32-bit platforms this identifier
is not exposed, as inodes are limited to 32 bits. Instead expose the
identifier via export_fh, which makes it available to userspace via
name_to_handle_at.
In addition we implement fh_to_dentry, which allows userspace to
recover a pidfd from a pidfs file handle.
Signed-off-by: Erin Shepherd <erin.shepherd@....eu>
[brauner: patch heavily rewritten]
Co-Developed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
---
fs/fhandle.c | 34 +++++++++++----------
fs/pidfs.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c
index 23491094032ec037066a271873ea8ff794616bee..4c847ca16fabe31d51ff5698b0c9c355c3e2fb67 100644
--- a/fs/fhandle.c
+++ b/fs/fhandle.c
@@ -268,20 +268,6 @@ static int do_handle_to_path(struct file_handle *handle, struct path *path,
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Allow relaxed permissions of file handles if the caller has the
- * ability to mount the filesystem or create a bind-mount of the
- * provided @mountdirfd.
- *
- * In both cases the caller may be able to get an unobstructed way to
- * the encoded file handle. If the caller is only able to create a
- * bind-mount we need to verify that there are no locked mounts on top
- * of it that could prevent us from getting to the encoded file.
- *
- * In principle, locked mounts can prevent the caller from mounting the
- * filesystem but that only applies to procfs and sysfs neither of which
- * support decoding file handles.
- */
static inline bool may_decode_fh(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
unsigned int o_flags)
{
@@ -291,6 +277,19 @@ static inline bool may_decode_fh(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
return true;
/*
+ * Allow relaxed permissions of file handles if the caller has the
+ * ability to mount the filesystem or create a bind-mount of the
+ * provided @mountdirfd.
+ *
+ * In both cases the caller may be able to get an unobstructed way to
+ * the encoded file handle. If the caller is only able to create a
+ * bind-mount we need to verify that there are no locked mounts on top
+ * of it that could prevent us from getting to the encoded file.
+ *
+ * In principle, locked mounts can prevent the caller from mounting the
+ * filesystem but that only applies to procfs and sysfs neither of which
+ * support decoding file handles.
+ *
* Restrict to O_DIRECTORY to provide a deterministic API that avoids a
* confusing api in the face of disconnected non-dir dentries.
*
@@ -397,6 +396,7 @@ static long do_handle_open(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
long retval = 0;
struct path path __free(path_put) = {};
struct file *file;
+ const struct export_operations *eops;
retval = handle_to_path(mountdirfd, ufh, &path, open_flag);
if (retval)
@@ -406,7 +406,11 @@ static long do_handle_open(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
- file = file_open_root(&path, "", open_flag, 0);
+ eops = path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_export_op;
+ if (eops->open)
+ file = eops->open(&path, open_flag);
+ else
+ file = file_open_root(&path, "", open_flag, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c
index f73a47e1d8379df886a90a044fb887f8d06f7c0b..f09af08a4abe4a9100ed972bee8f5c5d7ab33d84 100644
--- a/fs/pidfs.c
+++ b/fs/pidfs.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
+#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
@@ -454,6 +455,100 @@ static const struct dentry_operations pidfs_dentry_operations = {
.d_prune = stashed_dentry_prune,
};
+static int pidfs_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, u32 *fh, int *max_len,
+ struct inode *parent)
+{
+ struct pid *pid = inode->i_private;
+
+ if (*max_len < 2) {
+ *max_len = 2;
+ return FILEID_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ *max_len = 2;
+ *(u64 *)fh = pid->ino;
+ return FILEID_KERNFS;
+}
+
+/* Find a struct pid based on the inode number. */
+static struct pid *pidfs_ino_get_pid(u64 ino)
+{
+ ino_t pid_ino = pidfs_ino(ino);
+ u32 gen = pidfs_gen(ino);
+ struct pid *pid;
+
+ guard(rcu)();
+
+ /* Handle @pid lookup carefully so there's no risk of UAF. */
+ pid = idr_find(&pidfs_ino_idr, (u32)pid_ino);
+ if (!pid)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (sizeof(ino_t) < sizeof(u64)) {
+ if (gen && pidfs_gen(pid->ino) != gen)
+ pid = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (pidfs_ino(pid->ino) != pid_ino)
+ pid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Within our pid namespace hierarchy? */
+ if (pid_vnr(pid) == 0)
+ pid = NULL;
+
+ return get_pid(pid);
+}
+
+static struct dentry *pidfs_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct fid *fid, int fh_len,
+ int fh_type)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u64 pid_ino;
+ struct path path;
+ struct pid *pid;
+
+ if (fh_len < 2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ switch (fh_type) {
+ case FILEID_KERNFS:
+ pid_ino = *(u64 *)fid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ pid = pidfs_ino_get_pid(pid_ino);
+ if (!pid)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = path_from_stashed(&pid->stashed, pidfs_mnt, pid, &path);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ mntput(path.mnt);
+ return path.dentry;
+}
+
+static int pidfs_export_permission(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
+ unsigned int oflags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file *pidfs_export_open(struct path *path, unsigned int oflags)
+{
+ return dentry_open(path, oflags | O_RDWR, current_cred());
+}
+
+static const struct export_operations pidfs_export_operations = {
+ .encode_fh = pidfs_encode_fh,
+ .fh_to_dentry = pidfs_fh_to_dentry,
+ .open = pidfs_export_open,
+ .permission = pidfs_export_permission,
+};
+
static int pidfs_init_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data)
{
struct pid *pid = data;
@@ -488,6 +583,7 @@ static int pidfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->ops = &pidfs_sops;
+ ctx->eops = &pidfs_export_operations;
ctx->dops = &pidfs_dentry_operations;
fc->s_fs_info = (void *)&pidfs_stashed_ops;
return 0;
--
2.45.2
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