Message-ID: <CABi2SkUFCqy0pWfrOcfC0a0GMVpFODtb=Hunw6WW1D5N-A_MXw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 12:38:27 -0800
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, keescook@...omium.org, jannh@...gle.com, 
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	groeck@...omium.org, mpe@...erman.id.au
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings

On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 10:29 AM Lorenzo Stoakes
<lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 08:20:21PM +0000, jeffxu@...omium.org wrote:
> > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> >
> > Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
> >
> > Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect
> > them from ever changing or unmapped during the life time of the process.
> > For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see mseal.rst [1].
> >
> > System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are
> > generated by the kernel during program initialization, and are
> > sealed after creation.
> >
> > Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not
> > established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same
> > as the process's lifetime [2]. It is sealed from creation.
> >
> > The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
> > _install_special_mapping() function. As no other mappings utilize this
> > function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within
> > _install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of
> > modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.
> >
> > The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is
> > sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure
> > case of using vsyscall.
> >
> > It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may
> > alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore
> > operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled
> > across all systems.
> >
> > Currently, memory sealing is only functional in a 64-bit kernel
> > configuration.
> >
> > To enable this feature, the architecture needs to be tested to
> > confirm that it doesn't unmap/remap system mappings during the
> > the life time of the process. After the architecture enables
> > ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS, a distribution can set
> > CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPING to manage access to the feature.
> > Alternatively, kernel command line (exec.seal_system_mappings)
> > enables this feature also.
> >
> > This feature is tested using ChromeOS and Android on X86_64 and ARM64,
> > therefore ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS is set for X86_64 and ARM64.
> > Other architectures can enable this after testing. No specific hardware
> > features from the CPU are needed.
> >
> > This feature's security enhancements will benefit ChromeOS, Android,
> > and other secure-by-default systems.
> >
> > [1] Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> > ---
> >  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 11 ++++++
> >  Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst         |  4 ++
> >  arch/arm64/Kconfig                            |  1 +
> >  arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  1 +
> >  arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c         |  8 +++-
> >  include/linux/mm.h                            | 12 ++++++
> >  init/Kconfig                                  | 25 ++++++++++++
> >  mm/mmap.c                                     | 10 +++++
> >  mm/mseal.c                                    | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/Kconfig                              | 24 ++++++++++++
> >  10 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index e7bfe1bde49e..f63268341739 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -1538,6 +1538,17 @@
> >                       Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of
> >                       current integrity status.
> >
> > +     exec.seal_system_mappings = [KNL]
> > +                     Format: { no | yes }
> > +                     Seal system mappings: vdso, vvar, sigpage, vsyscall,
> > +                     uprobe.
> > +                     - 'no':  do not seal system mappings.
> > +                     - 'yes': seal system mappings.
> > +                     This overrides CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS=(y/n)
> > +                     If not specified or invalid, default is the value set by
> > +                     CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS.
> > +                     This option has no effect if CONFIG_64BIT=n
> > +
> >       early_page_ext [KNL,EARLY] Enforces page_ext initialization to earlier
> >                       stages so cover more early boot allocations.
> >                       Please note that as side effect some optimizations
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > index 41102f74c5e2..bec122318a59 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > @@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ Use cases
> >
> >  - Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
> >
> > +- seal system mappings:
> > +  kernel config CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS seals system mappings such
> > +  as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
> > +
> >  When not to use mseal
> >  =====================
> >  Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > index 63de71544d95..fc5da8f74342 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ config ARM64
> >       select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS
> >       select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
> >       select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
> > +     select ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> >       select ARCH_STACKWALK
> >       select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
> >       select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > index 1ea18662942c..5f6bac99974c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64
> >       depends on 64BIT
> >       # Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only:
> >       select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
> > +     select ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> >       select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
> >       select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK
> >       select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGE_PFNMAP if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > index 2fb7d53cf333..30e0958915ca 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > @@ -366,8 +366,12 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
> >               set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
> >       }
> >
> > -     if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY)
> > -             vm_flags_init(&gate_vma, VM_EXEC);
> > +     if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY) {
> > +             unsigned long vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
> > +
> > +             vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();
> > +             vm_flags_init(&gate_vma, vm_flags);
> > +     }
> >
> >       BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
> >                    (unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index df0a5eac66b7..f787d6c85cbb 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -4238,4 +4238,16 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *st
> >  int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> >  int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> > +/*
> > + * return VM_SEALED if seal system mapping is enabled.
> > + */
> > +unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void);
> > +#else
> > +static inline unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void)
> > +{
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
>
> OK so we can set seal system mappings on a 32-bit system and
> silently... just not do it?...
>
I don't understand what you meant.

The function returns the vm_flags for seal system mappings.
In 32 bit, it returns 0.

the caller (in mmap.c) does below:
vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();

(The pattern is recommended by Liam. )

Is that because the function name is misleading ? I can change it to
seal_flags_system_mappings() if there is no objection to the long
name.

> > +#endif
> > +
> >  #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
> > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> > index 1aa95a5dfff8..614719259aa0 100644
> > --- a/init/Kconfig
> > +++ b/init/Kconfig
> > @@ -1860,6 +1860,31 @@ config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
> >  config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
> >       bool
> >
> > +config ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +     bool
> > +     help
> > +       Control SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS access based on architecture.
> > +
> > +       A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > +       No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > +       To enable this feature, the architecture needs to be tested to
> > +       confirm that it doesn't unmap/remap system mappings during the
> > +       the life time of the process. After the architecture enables this,
> > +       a distribution can set CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPING to manage access
> > +       to the feature.
> > +
> > +       The CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS already checks the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > +       feature, which is known to remap/unmap vdso.  Thus, the presence of
> > +       CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is not considered a factor in enabling
> > +       ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS for a architecture.
> > +
> > +       For complete list of system mappings, please see
> > +       CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS.
> > +
> > +       For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > +       Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> >  config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
> >       bool
> >       help
> > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> > index 57fd5ab2abe7..bc694c555805 100644
> > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > @@ -2133,6 +2133,16 @@ struct vm_area_struct *_install_special_mapping(
> >       unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> >       unsigned long vm_flags, const struct vm_special_mapping *spec)
> >  {
> > +     /*
> > +      * At present, all mappings (vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe) that
> > +      * invoke the _install_special_mapping function can be sealed.
> > +      * Therefore, it is logical to call the seal_system_mappings_enabled()
> > +      * function here. In the future, if this is not the case, i.e. if certain
> > +      * mappings cannot be sealed, then it would be necessary to move this
> > +      * check to the calling function.
> > +      */
> > +     vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();
> > +
> >       return __install_special_mapping(mm, addr, len, vm_flags, (void *)spec,
> >                                       &special_mapping_vmops);
> >  }
> > diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
> > index ece977bd21e1..80126d6231bb 100644
> > --- a/mm/mseal.c
> > +++ b/mm/mseal.c
> > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> >   *  Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> >   */
> >
> > +#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
> >  #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
> >  #include <linux/mman.h>
> >  #include <linux/mm.h>
> > @@ -266,3 +267,41 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
> >  {
> >       return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
> >  }
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Kernel cmdline override for CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + */
> > +enum seal_system_mappings_type {
> > +     SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED,
> > +     SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED
> > +};
> > +
> > +static enum seal_system_mappings_type seal_system_mappings_v __ro_after_init =
> > +     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS) ? SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED :
> > +     SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED;
> > +
> > +static const struct constant_table value_table_sys_mapping[] __initconst = {
> > +     { "no", SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED},
> > +     { "yes", SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED},
> > +     { }
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int __init early_seal_system_mappings_override(char *buf)
> > +{
> > +     if (!buf)
> > +             return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +     seal_system_mappings_v = lookup_constant(value_table_sys_mapping,
> > +                     buf, seal_system_mappings_v);
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +early_param("exec.seal_system_mappings", early_seal_system_mappings_override);
> > +
> > +unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void)
> > +{
> > +     if (seal_system_mappings_v == SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED)
> > +             return VM_SEALED;
> > +
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index 28e685f53bd1..5bbb8d989d79 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -51,6 +51,30 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
> >
> >  endchoice
> >
> > +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +     bool "seal system mappings"
>
> I'd prefer an 'mseal' here please, it's becoming hard to grep for this
> stuff. We overload 'seal' too much and I want to be able to identify what
> is a memfd seal and what is an mseal or whatever else...
>
I m OK with MSEAL_

> > +     default n
> > +     depends on 64BIT
> > +     depends on ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +     depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>
> I don't know why we bother setting restrictions on this but allow them to
> be overriden with a boot flag?
>
The idea is a distribution might not enable kernel security features
by default, and kernel cmdline provides flexibility to let users
enable it.

This is the same approach as  proc_mem.force_override kernel cmd line
where Kees recommended  [1], I would prefer to keep this as is.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/202402261110.B8129C002@keescook/

> This means somebody with CRIU enabled could enable this and have a broken
> kernel right? We can't allow that.
>
> I'd much prefer we either:
>
> 1. Just have a CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS flag. _or_
> 2. Have CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS enable, allow kernel flag to disable.
>
> In both cases you #ifdef on CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS, and the
> restrictions appply correctly.
>
> If in the future we decide this feature is stable and ready and good to
> enable globally we can just change the default on this to y at some later
> date?
>
> Otherwise it just seems like in a effect the kernel command line flag is a
> debug flag to experiment on arbitrary kernels?
>
> > +     help
> > +       Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, vsyscall, uprobes.
> > +
> > +       A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > +       No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > +       Depends on the ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS.
> > +
> > +       CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore,
> > +       and remap/unmap will fail when the mapping is sealed, therefore
> > +       !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency.
> > +
> > +       Kernel command line exec.seal_system_mappings=(no/yes) overrides
> > +       this.
> > +
> > +       For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > +       Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> >  config SECURITY
> >       bool "Enable different security models"
> >       depends on SYSFS
> > --
> > 2.47.0.338.g60cca15819-goog
> >

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