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Message-ID: <173340169364.412.10393076400350306074.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2024 12:28:13 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject:
 [tip: x86/boot] x86/sev: Avoid WARN()s and panic()s in early boot code

The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     09d35045cd0f4265cf1dfe18ef83285fdc294688
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/09d35045cd0f4265cf1dfe18ef83285fdc294688
Author:        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
AuthorDate:    Thu, 05 Dec 2024 12:28:06 +01:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Thu, 05 Dec 2024 13:18:54 +01:00

x86/sev: Avoid WARN()s and panic()s in early boot code

Using WARN() or panic() while executing from the early 1:1 mapping is
unlikely to do anything useful: the string literals are passed using
their kernel virtual addresses which are not even mapped yet. But even
if they were, calling into the printk() machinery from the early 1:1
mapped code is not going to get very far.

So drop the WARN()s entirely, and replace panic() with a deadloop.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241205112804.3416920-10-ardb+git@google.com
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c   | 15 +++++----------
 arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c |  9 +++++----
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index c5b0148..499b419 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -777,15 +777,10 @@ early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 
 		val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
 
-		if (WARN(GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP,
-			 "Wrong PSC response code: 0x%x\n",
-			 (unsigned int)GHCB_RESP_CODE(val)))
+		if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP)
 			goto e_term;
 
-		if (WARN(GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val),
-			 "Failed to change page state to '%s' paddr 0x%lx error 0x%llx\n",
-			 op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ? "private" : "shared",
-			 paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val)))
+		if (GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val))
 			goto e_term;
 
 		/* Page validation must be performed after changing to private */
@@ -821,7 +816,7 @@ void __head early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
 	early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
 }
 
-void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+void __head early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					unsigned long npages)
 {
 	/*
@@ -2361,8 +2356,8 @@ static __head void svsm_setup(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
 	call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA);
 	call.rcx = pa;
 	ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
-	if (ret)
-		panic("Can't remap the SVSM CA, ret=%d, rax_out=0x%llx\n", ret, call.rax_out);
+	while (ret)
+		cpu_relax(); /* too early to panic */
 
 	RIP_REL_REF(boot_svsm_caa) = (struct svsm_ca *)pa;
 	RIP_REL_REF(boot_svsm_caa_pa) = pa;
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
index 71de531..afb7ffc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ static void svsm_pval_terminate(struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc, int ret, u64 svs
 	__pval_terminate(pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
 }
 
-static void svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
+static void __head svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
 {
 	struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc;
 	struct svsm_call call = {};
@@ -1275,12 +1275,13 @@ static void svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
 
 	ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
 	if (ret)
-		svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
 
 	native_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
-static void pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
+static void __head pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+				     bool validate)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1293,7 +1294,7 @@ static void pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, bool val
 	} else {
 		ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
 		if (ret)
-			__pval_terminate(PHYS_PFN(paddr), validate, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, ret, 0);
+			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
 	}
 }
 

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