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Message-ID: <202412082005.OBJ0BbWs-lkp@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2024 12:47:33 +0800
From: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@...aro.org>
Subject: arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1046:36: sparse: sparse: cast removes
address space '__user' of expression
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
head: 7503345ac5f5e82fd9a36d6e6b447c016376403a
commit: 5d8b172e7005c6b42c16a0952c1d8873051d68ae arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS)
date: 9 weeks ago
config: arm64-randconfig-r133-20241208 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241208/202412082005.OBJ0BbWs-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.0.0git (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 592c0fe55f6d9a811028b5f3507be91458ab2713)
reproduce: (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241208/202412082005.OBJ0BbWs-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202412082005.OBJ0BbWs-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1046:36: sparse: sparse: cast removes address space '__user' of expression
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1054:9: sparse: sparse: cast removes address space '__user' of expression
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1461:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected void ( [noderef] [usertype] __user *[assigned] [usertype] sigtramp )( ... ) @@ got void * @@
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1461:26: sparse: expected void ( [noderef] [usertype] __user *[assigned] [usertype] sigtramp )( ... )
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1461:26: sparse: got void *
vim +/__user +1046 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
2c020ed8d148f7 Catalin Marinas 2012-03-05 1010
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1011 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_GCS
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1012 static int gcs_restore_signal(void)
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1013 {
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1014 unsigned long __user *gcspr_el0;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1015 u64 cap;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1016 int ret;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1017
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1018 if (!system_supports_gcs())
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1019 return 0;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1020
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1021 if (!(current->thread.gcs_el0_mode & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE))
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1022 return 0;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1023
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1024 gcspr_el0 = (unsigned long __user *)read_sysreg_s(SYS_GCSPR_EL0);
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1025
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1026 /*
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1027 * Ensure that any changes to the GCS done via GCS operations
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1028 * are visible to the normal reads we do to validate the
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1029 * token.
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1030 */
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1031 gcsb_dsync();
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1032
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1033 /*
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1034 * GCSPR_EL0 should be pointing at a capped GCS, read the cap.
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1035 * We don't enforce that this is in a GCS page, if it is not
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1036 * then faults will be generated on GCS operations - the main
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1037 * concern is to protect GCS pages.
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1038 */
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1039 ret = copy_from_user(&cap, gcspr_el0, sizeof(cap));
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1040 if (ret)
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1041 return -EFAULT;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1042
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1043 /*
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1044 * Check that the cap is the actual GCS before replacing it.
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1045 */
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 @1046 if (!gcs_signal_cap_valid((u64)gcspr_el0, cap))
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1047 return -EINVAL;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1048
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1049 /* Invalidate the token to prevent reuse */
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1050 put_user_gcs(0, (__user void*)gcspr_el0, &ret);
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1051 if (ret != 0)
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1052 return -EFAULT;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1053
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1054 write_sysreg_s(gcspr_el0 + 1, SYS_GCSPR_EL0);
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1055
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1056 return 0;
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1057 }
eaf62ce1563b85 Mark Brown 2024-10-01 1058
:::::: The code at line 1046 was first introduced by commit
:::::: eaf62ce1563b8557e3550acb97d5086120168750 arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers
:::::: TO: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
:::::: CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
--
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https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
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