[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <b1d90372-ed95-41ce-976f-3f119735707c@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 22:43:05 +0530
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@....com, x86@...nel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, pgonda@...gle.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR
interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
On 12/10/2024 5:41 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:38PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> index af28fb962309..59c5e716fdd1 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> @@ -1473,6 +1473,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>> if (regs->cx == MSR_IA32_TSC && (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
>> return __vc_handle_msr_tsc(regs, write);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
>> + * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
>> + */
>> + if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ && (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
>> + return ES_VMM_ERROR;
>> +
>> +
>
> If you merge this logic into the switch-case, the patch becomes even easier
> and the code cleaner:
This is incorrect, for a non-Secure TSC guest, a read of intercepted
MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ will return value of rdtsc_ordered(). This is an invalid
MSR when SecureTSC is not enabled.
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> index 050170eb28e6..35d9a3bb4b06 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,13 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_tsc(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
> if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
> goto read_tsc;
>
> + /*
> + * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
> + * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
> + */
> + if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
> + return ES_VMM_ERROR;
> +
> if (write) {
> WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
> return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
> @@ -1472,6 +1479,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> case MSR_SVSM_CAA:
> return __vc_handle_msr_caa(regs, write);
> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> + case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ:
> return __vc_handle_msr_tsc(regs, write);
> default:
> break;
>
Regards
Nikunj
Powered by blists - more mailing lists