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Message-ID: <CAG48ez12K25yNWaAXqMnC8tfpTQFOwzvPsyE7r8N1NM9wqfzzw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 18:14:53 +0100
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, 
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, 
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] mm: abstract get_arg_page() stack expansion and mmap
 read lock

On Tue, Dec 3, 2024 at 7:05 PM Lorenzo Stoakes
<lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com> wrote:
> Right now fs/exec.c invokes expand_downwards(), an otherwise internal
> implementation detail of the VMA logic in order to ensure that an arg page
> can be obtained by get_user_pages_remote().
>
> In order to be able to move the stack expansion logic into mm/vma.c in
> order to make it available to userland testing we need to find an
> alternative approach here.
>
> We do so by providing the mmap_read_lock_maybe_expand() function which also
> helpfully documents what get_arg_page() is doing here and adds an
> additional check against VM_GROWSDOWN to make explicit that the stack
> expansion logic is only invoked when the VMA is indeed a downward-growing
> stack.
>
> This allows expand_downwards() to become a static function.
>
> Importantly, the VMA referenced by mmap_read_maybe_expand() must NOT be
> currently user-visible in any way, that is place within an rmap or VMA
> tree. It must be a newly allocated VMA.
>
> This is the case when exec invokes this function.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
> ---
>  fs/exec.c          | 14 +++---------
>  include/linux/mm.h |  5 ++---
>  mm/mmap.c          | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 98cb7ba9983c..1e1f79c514de 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -205,18 +205,10 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
>         /*
>          * Avoid relying on expanding the stack down in GUP (which
>          * does not work for STACK_GROWSUP anyway), and just do it
> -        * by hand ahead of time.
> +        * ahead of time.
>          */
> -       if (write && pos < vma->vm_start) {
> -               mmap_write_lock(mm);
> -               ret = expand_downwards(vma, pos);
> -               if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
> -                       mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> -                       return NULL;
> -               }
> -               mmap_write_downgrade(mm);
> -       } else
> -               mmap_read_lock(mm);
> +       if (!mmap_read_lock_maybe_expand(mm, vma, pos, write))
> +               return NULL;
[...]
> +/*
> + * Obtain a read lock on mm->mmap_lock, if the specified address is below the
> + * start of the VMA, the intent is to perform a write, and it is a
> + * downward-growing stack, then attempt to expand the stack to contain it.
> + *
> + * This function is intended only for obtaining an argument page from an ELF
> + * image, and is almost certainly NOT what you want to use for any other
> + * purpose.
> + *
> + * IMPORTANT - VMA fields are accessed without an mmap lock being held, so the
> + * VMA referenced must not be linked in any user-visible tree, i.e. it must be a
> + * new VMA being mapped.
> + *
> + * The function assumes that addr is either contained within the VMA or below
> + * it, and makes no attempt to validate this value beyond that.
> + *
> + * Returns true if the read lock was obtained and a stack was perhaps expanded,
> + * false if the stack expansion failed.
> + *
> + * On stack expansion the function temporarily acquires an mmap write lock
> + * before downgrading it.
> + */
> +bool mmap_read_lock_maybe_expand(struct mm_struct *mm,
> +                                struct vm_area_struct *new_vma,
> +                                unsigned long addr, bool write)
> +{
> +       if (!write || addr >= new_vma->vm_start) {
> +               mmap_read_lock(mm);
> +               return true;
> +       }
> +
> +       if (!(new_vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
> +               return false;
> +
> +       mmap_write_lock(mm);
> +       if (expand_downwards(new_vma, addr)) {
> +               mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> +               return false;
> +       }
> +
> +       mmap_write_downgrade(mm);
> +       return true;
> +}

Random thought: For write==1, this looks a bit like
lock_mm_and_find_vma(mm, addr, NULL), which needs similar stack
expansion logic for handling userspace faults. But it's for a
sufficiently different situation that maybe it makes sense to keep it
like you did it, as a separate function...

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