linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests

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Message-ID: <0477b378-aa35-4a68-9ff6-308aada2e790@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 10:32:23 +0530
From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@....com, x86@...nel.org,
 kvm@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
 dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, pgonda@...gle.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
 pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC
 enabled guests

On 12/9/2024 9:27 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:36PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as
>> the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined.
> 
> What does that mean exactly?

That is the warning from the APM: 15.36.18 Secure TSC

"Guests that run with Secure TSC enabled are not expected to perform writes to
the TSC MSR (10h). If such a write occurs, subsequent TSC values read are
undefined."

What I make out of it is: if a write is performed to the TSC MSR, subsequent
reads of TSC is not reliable/trusted.

That was the reason to ignore such writes in the #VC handler.

> 
> I'd prefer if we issued a WARN_ONCE() there on the write to catch any
> offenders.

Do you also want to terminate the offending guest?

ES_UNSUPPORTED return will do that.

>
> *NO ONE* should be writing the TSC MSR but that's a different story.
> 
> IOW, something like this ontop of yours?
> 
> ---
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> index c22cb2ea4b99..050170eb28e6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> @@ -1443,9 +1443,15 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_tsc(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
>  {
>  	u64 tsc;
>  
> -	if (write)
> -		return ES_OK;
> +	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
> +		goto read_tsc;

This is changing the behavior for SEV-ES and SNP guests(non SECURE_TSC), TSC MSR
reads are converted to RDTSC. This is a good optimization. But just wanted to
bring up the subtle impact.

> +
> +	if (write) {
> +		WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
> +		return ES_UNSUPPORTED;

Sure, we can add a WARN_ONCE().

> +	}
>  
> +read_tsc:
>  	tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
>  	regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
>  	regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
> @@ -1462,11 +1468,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>  	/* Is it a WRMSR? */
>  	write = ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30;
>  
> -	if (regs->cx == MSR_SVSM_CAA)
> +	switch(regs->cx) {

Yes, I was thinking about a switch, as there will be more such instances when we
enable newer features.

> +	case MSR_SVSM_CAA:
>  		return __vc_handle_msr_caa(regs, write);
> -
> -	if (regs->cx == MSR_IA32_TSC && (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
> +	case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>  		return __vc_handle_msr_tsc(regs, write);
> +	default:
> +		break;
> +	}
>  
>  	ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
>  	if (write) {
> 

Regards,
Nikunj