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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSNc5AeVDh69SV9-pSLgsC1T0Fip=Y3nepYCdc8FBFijg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 13:02:46 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Joey Jiao <quic_jiangenj@...cinc.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>, Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
"open list:SELINUX SECURITY MODULE" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>, open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel@...cinc.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: KASAN; slab-out-of-bounds in avc_lookup
On Mon, Dec 9, 2024 at 8:00 PM Joey Jiao <quic_jiangenj@...cinc.com> wrote:
> From: "Jiao, Joey" <quic_jiangenj@...cinc.com>
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in avc_lookup+0x174/0x298
> Read of size 8 at addr ffffff8846ef70b1 by task spdaemon/1037
>
> Call trace:
> dump_backtrace+0xf0/0x13c
> show_stack+0x18/0x28
> dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x128
> print_report+0x13c/0x6f8
> kasan_report+0xe8/0x148
> __asan_load8+0x98/0xa0
> avc_lookup+0x174/0x298
> avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x60/0x12c
> selinux_inode_permission+0x278/0x3cc
> security_inode_permission+0x84/0xc8
> inode_permission+0xb8/0x2b8
> link_path_walk+0x178/0x7c0
> path_lookupat+0x6c/0x298
> filename_lookup+0x11c/0x2e4
> vfs_statx+0xb4/0x3f0
> vfs_fstatat+0xfc/0x3e4
> __arm64_sys_newfstatat+0x88/0x340
> invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x17c
> el0_svc_common+0xf8/0x138
> do_el0_svc+0x30/0x40
> el0_svc+0x3c/0x70
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc
> el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
>
> To fix this, protect the rcu read access
>
> Signed-off-by: Jiao, Joey <quic_jiangenj@...cinc.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/avc.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 32eb67fb3e42..ded3823d4451 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
>
> hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
> + rcu_read_lock();
> hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
> if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
> tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
> @@ -536,6 +537,7 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
> break;
> }
> }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
>
> return ret;
> }
> --
> 2.47.1
Thanks for the bug report, do you have any more information about the
kernel that demonstrated this problem?
I'm asking because when I look at the kernel sources, all callers of
avc_search_node() should already be holding the RCU read lock:
avc_has_extended_perms() or avc_has_perm_noaudit()
avc_lookup()
avc_search_node()
--
paul-moore.com
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