linux-kernel - [PATCH] x86/fpu: Refine magic number check during signal return

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20241211014500.3738-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 17:45:00 -0800
From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: x86@...nel.org,
	tglx@...utronix.de,
	mingo@...hat.com,
	bp@...en8.de,
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
	chang.seok.bae@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Refine magic number check during signal return

Before restoring xstate from the user space buffer, the kernel performs
sanity checks on these magic numbers: magic1 in the software reserved
area, and magic2 at the end of XSAVE region.

The position of magic2 is calculated based on the xstate size derived
from the user space buffer. But, the in-kernel record is directly
available and reliable for this purpose.

This reliance on user space data is also inconsistent with the recent
fix in commit d877550eaf2d ("x86/fpu: Stop relying on userspace for info
to fault in xsave buffer").

Simply use fpstate->user_size, and then get rid of unnecessary
size-evaluation code.

Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 11 +++--------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
index 8f62e0666dea..6c69cb28b298 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -27,19 +27,14 @@
 static inline bool check_xstate_in_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fxbuf,
 					    struct _fpx_sw_bytes *fx_sw)
 {
-	int min_xstate_size = sizeof(struct fxregs_state) +
-			      sizeof(struct xstate_header);
 	void __user *fpstate = fxbuf;
 	unsigned int magic2;
 
 	if (__copy_from_user(fx_sw, &fxbuf->sw_reserved[0], sizeof(*fx_sw)))
 		return false;
 
-	/* Check for the first magic field and other error scenarios. */
-	if (fx_sw->magic1 != FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 ||
-	    fx_sw->xstate_size < min_xstate_size ||
-	    fx_sw->xstate_size > current->thread.fpu.fpstate->user_size ||
-	    fx_sw->xstate_size > fx_sw->extended_size)
+	/* Check for the first magic field */
+	if (fx_sw->magic1 != FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1)
 		goto setfx;
 
 	/*
@@ -48,7 +43,7 @@ static inline bool check_xstate_in_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fxbuf,
 	 * fpstate layout with out copying the extended state information
 	 * in the memory layout.
 	 */
-	if (__get_user(magic2, (__u32 __user *)(fpstate + fx_sw->xstate_size)))
+	if (__get_user(magic2, (__u32 __user *)(fpstate + current->thread.fpu.fpstate->user_size)))
 		return false;
 
 	if (likely(magic2 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2))
-- 
2.45.2