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Message-ID: <Z1zsWoRhVaqXkVbb@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2024 10:24:26 +0800
From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
Cc: kexec@...ts.infradead.org, Ondrej Kozina <okozina@...hat.com>,
Milan Broz <gmazyland@...il.com>,
Thomas Staudt <tstaudt@...ibm.com>,
Daniel P . Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com>,
Kairui Song <ryncsn@...il.com>,
Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@...hat.com>,
Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@...il.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing
LUKS volume keys
Hi Coiby,
On 10/29/24 at 01:52pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
> LUKS is the standard for Linux disk encryption, widely adopted by users,
> and in some cases, such as Confidential VMs, it is a requirement. With
> kdump enabled, when the first kernel crashes, the system can boot into
> the kdump/crash kernel to dump the memory image (i.e., /proc/vmcore)
> to a specified target. However, there are two challenges when dumping
> vmcore to a LUKS-encrypted device:
Other than those small concerns, and the lkp reported issue, the overral
series looks good to me. Thanks for the effort.
Thanks
Baoquan
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