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Message-ID: <2024121450-scrawny-payphone-71b5@gregkh>
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2024 10:12:19 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
	Thomas Weißschuh <linux@...ssschuh.net>,
	Nilay Shroff <nilay@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>, Qing Zhao <qing.zhao@...cle.com>,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fortify: Hide run-time copy size from value range
 tracking

On Fri, Dec 13, 2024 at 05:36:10PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> GCC performs value range tracking for variables as a way to provide better
> diagnostics. One place this is regularly seen is with warnings associated
> with bounds-checking, e.g. -Wstringop-overflow, -Wstringop-overread,
> -Warray-bounds, etc. In order to keep the signal-to-noise ratio high,
> warnings aren't emitted when a value range spans the entire value range
> representable by a given variable. For example:
> 
> 	unsigned int len;
> 	char dst[8];
> 	...
> 	memcpy(dst, src, len);
> 
> If len's value is unknown, it has the full "unsigned int" range of [0,
> UINT_MAX], and bounds checks against memcpy() will be ignored. However,
> when a code path has been able to narrow the range:
> 
> 	if (len > 16)
> 		return;
> 	memcpy(dst, src, len);
> 
> Then a range will be updated for the execution path. Above, len is now
> [0, 16], so we might see a -Wstringop-overflow warning like:
> 
> 	error: '__builtin_memcpy' writing between 9 and 16 bytes from to region of size 8 [-Werror=stringop-overflow]
> 
> When building with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, the run-time bounds checking
> can appear to narrow value ranges for lengths for memcpy(), depending on
> how the compile constructs the execution paths during optimization
> passes, due to the checks on the size. For example:
> 
> 	if (p_size_field != SIZE_MAX &&
> 	    p_size != p_size_field && p_size_field < size)
> 
> As intentionally designed, these checks only affect the kernel warnings
> emitted at run-time and do not block the potentially overflowing memcpy(),
> so GCC thinks it needs to produce a warning about the resulting value
> range that might be reaching the memcpy().
> 
> We have seen this manifest a few times now, with the most recent being
> with cpumasks:
> 
> In function ‘bitmap_copy’,
>     inlined from ‘cpumask_copy’ at ./include/linux/cpumask.h:839:2,
>     inlined from ‘__padata_set_cpumasks’ at kernel/padata.c:730:2:
> ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:114:33: error: ‘__builtin_memcpy’ reading between 257 and 536870904 bytes from a region of size 256 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
>   114 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
>       |                                 ^
> ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:633:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘__underlying_memcpy’
>   633 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
>       |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
> ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:678:26: note: in expansion of macro ‘__fortify_memcpy_chk’
>   678 | #define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,                  \
>       |                          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> ./include/linux/bitmap.h:259:17: note: in expansion of macro ‘memcpy’
>   259 |                 memcpy(dst, src, len);
>       |                 ^~~~~~
> kernel/padata.c: In function ‘__padata_set_cpumasks’:
> kernel/padata.c:713:48: note: source object ‘pcpumask’ of size [0, 256]
>   713 |                                  cpumask_var_t pcpumask,
>       |                                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~
> 
> This warning is _not_ emitted when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is disabled,
> and with the recent -fdiagnostics-details we can confirm the origin of
> the warning is due to the FORTIFY range checking:
> 
> ../include/linux/bitmap.h:259:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
>   259 |                 memcpy(dst, src, len);
>       |                 ^~~~~~
>   '__padata_set_cpumasks': events 1-2
> ../include/linux/fortify-string.h:613:36:
>   612 |         if (p_size_field != SIZE_MAX &&
>       |             ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>   613 |             p_size != p_size_field && p_size_field < size)
>       |             ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>       |                                    |
>       |                                    (1) when the condition is evaluated to false
>       |                                    (2) when the condition is evaluated to true
>   '__padata_set_cpumasks': event 3
>   114 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
>       |                                 ^
>       |                                 |
>       |                                 (3) out of array bounds here
> 
> Note that this warning started appearing since bitmap functions were
> recently marked __always_inline in commit ed8cd2b3bd9f ("bitmap: Switch
> from inline to __always_inline"), which allowed GCC to gain visibility
> into the variables as they passed through the FORTIFY implementation.
> 
> In order to silence this false positive but keep deterministic
> compile-time warnings intact, hide the length variable from GCC with
> OPTIMIZE_HIDE_VAR() before calling the builtin memcpy.
> 
> Additionally add a comment about why all the macro args have copies with
> const storage.
> 
> Reported-by: "Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@...ssschuh.net>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/db7190c8-d17f-4a0d-bc2f-5903c79f36c2@t-8ch.de/
> Reported-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@...ux.ibm.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241112124127.1666300-1-nilay@linux.ibm.com/
> Acked-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
> ---

Fixed the build issues I have here, so:

Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>


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