linux-kernel - [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Move the SNP probe routine out of the way

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Message-ID: <173420207145.412.17772875013895035804.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2024 18:47:51 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
 "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>,
 Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Move the SNP probe routine out of the way

The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     e2f3d40df82eeb70f6c3602418bca63c54183776
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/e2f3d40df82eeb70f6c3602418bca63c54183776
Author:        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 02 Dec 2024 14:50:49 -06:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Sat, 14 Dec 2024 11:08:48 +01:00

x86/sev: Move the SNP probe routine out of the way

To make patch review easier for the segmented RMP support, move the SNP
probe function out from in between the initialization-related routines.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Reviewed-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@....com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6c2975bbf132d567dd12e1435be1d18c0bf9131c.1733172653.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
---
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 18191cb..0df3789 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -135,36 +135,6 @@ static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
 	__snp_enable(smp_processor_id());
 }
 
-#define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13)
-
-bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
-{
-	u64 rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
-
-	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
-	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
-
-	if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) {
-		pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	if (rmp_base > rmp_end) {
-		pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
-
-	probed_rmp_base = rmp_base;
-	probed_rmp_size = rmp_sz;
-
-	pr_info("RMP table physical range [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
-		rmp_base, rmp_end);
-
-	return true;
-}
-
 static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tables(u64 pa)
 {
 	if (IS_ALIGNED(pa, PMD_SIZE))
@@ -291,6 +261,36 @@ nosnp:
  */
 device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
 
+#define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13)
+
+bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
+{
+	u64 rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
+
+	if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) {
+		pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (rmp_base > rmp_end) {
+		pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
+
+	probed_rmp_base = rmp_base;
+	probed_rmp_size = rmp_sz;
+
+	pr_info("RMP table physical range [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
+		rmp_base, rmp_end);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static struct rmpentry_raw *get_raw_rmpentry(u64 pfn)
 {
 	if (!rmptable)